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In for a Calf is not Always
in for a Cow:
An Analysis of the Constitutional
Right of Anonymity as Applied to
Anonymous E-Commerce
by SHARON K. SANDEEN*
I. Introduction
The advent of the information age and the expanded use of the
Internet have given rise to many interesting legal issues. An issue
that courts are sure to explore is the extent to which the United States
Constitution protects anonymous Internet communications from state
and federal regulation. The United States Supreme Court has
already addressed the question of anonymity in connection with
political speech, finding that there is a constitutional right to speak
anonymously in the political realm.' Most recently, the Court
addressed the same question in the religious context in a case brought
by Jehovah's Witnesses who objected to a law that required them to
obtain a permit before engaging in door-to-door activities.2 However,
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fifteen years. I would like to thank Pamela Samuelson for serving as my faculty advisor
during my year at Boalt and for providing invaluable guidance on this article. I would also
like to thank Jane K. Winn for her comments on an early draft of this article and Faye
Jones and the staff of the Gordon D. Schaber Law Library at McGeorge School of Law
for providing me with a comfortable and supportive place to work and to conduct much of
my research.
1. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960); McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Comm'n,
514 U.S. 334 (1995); Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
2. Watchtower Bible & Tract Soc'y of N.Y. v. The Vill. of Stratton, 122 S. Ct. 2080,
2090 n.14 (2002):
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as Justice Ginsburg artfully noted in her concurrence in McIntyre v.
Ohio Elections Commission, "[i]n for a calf is not always in for a
cow."3 Just because the Supreme Court recognized a constitutional
right of anonymity related to the distribution of political leaflets and
religious tracts does not mean that anonymous speech cannot be
regulated in other contexts. One context where the constitutional
right of anonymity is sure to arise is in connection with e-commerce'
and Internet advertising
Although the Jehovah's witnesses do not themselves object to a loss of
anonymity, they bring this facial challenge in part on the basis of overbreadth.
We may, therefore, consider the impact of this ordinance on the free speech
rights of individuals who are deterred from speaking because the registration
provision would require them to forgo their right to speak anonymously. See
Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973).
3. 514 U.S. at 358 (Ginsburg, J. concurring). The need for further definition of the
right of anonymity is perhaps best explained by the following comment: "No conceptual
breakthrough of any importance leads a static existence. This is especially true of
conceptual breakthroughs at the constitutional level. The breakthrough, once established,
has a tendency to expand until it meets countervailing forces strong enough to arrest it."
G. Sidney Buchanan, The Right of Privacy: Past, Present and Future, 16 OHIO N.U. L.
REV. 403, 436 (1989). The countervailing force at work here is the fraud and deception
that is made possible by anonymity on the Internet.
4. As used in this article, the term "e-commerce" refers to the offering for sale of
goods and services over the Internet and is intended to refer to all forms of Internet
advertising but does not refer to online discussion groups and chat rooms. See ENCARTA
WORLD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, (American ed. 2001), at http://dictionary.msn.com/find/
entry/.asp? search=e-commerce (last visited Dec. 31, 2001) (hereinafter "ENCARTA
DICTIONARY") ("E-commerce is 'business transacted online: transactions conducted over
the Internet, either by consumers purchasing goods and services, or directly between
businesses. Also called electronic commerce."').
5. Although a number of scholars have explored the issue of the First Amendment's
application to Internet communications generally (see, e.g., articles collected at 104 YALE
L.J. 1613-1850), I could not find an article that discusses the issue as it relates to
anonymous Internet advertising. In Flood Control on the Information Ocean; Living With
Anonymity, Digital Cash and Distributed Databases (hereinafter "Flood Control"), A.
Michael Froomkin discusses the issue in the contexts of political and non-political speech
and concludes that "[riestrictions on anonymity are more likely to be sustained if they
focus on types of non-political speech that have tended to receive the lowest protection."
15 U. PIrrT. J. of L. & Com. 395, 428-43 (1996); see also A. Michael Froomkin, The
Metaphor is the Key: Cryptography, The Clipper Chip and The Constitution, 143 U. PA. L.
REV. 709, 812-23 (1995) [hereinafter "Metaphor"] (discussing First Amendment issues
related to efforts to restrict cryptography including the U.S. government's "Clipper Chip"
initiative and the mandatory encryption key escrow provisions thereof); see also Scot M.
Graydon, Much Ado About Spam: Unsolicited Advertising, the Internet, and You, 32 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 77 (discussing the problems of spain from the recipients' point of view and
proposing a federal law to regulate spam); Consuelo Lauda Kertz & Lisa Boardman
Burnette, Telemarketing Tug-O-War: Balancing Telephone Information Technology and
the First Amendment with Consumer Protection and Privacy, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1029
(1992) (discussing First Amendment issues arising from efforts to regulate 900 numbers).
See Thomas I. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
[Vol. 29:3
As I discuss more fully in Section II of this article, there are
several reasons why anonymous commerce is likely to exist on the
Internet and why, in order to protect consumers and business owners,
Congress and the states should seek to ban such activity. One
problem is that while the Internet is a forum for increased political
and social discourse, it is also a place where false, unreliable,
defamatory, fraudulent and offensive messages can proliferate.6
Unfortunately, at the same time consumers can use the benefits of
anonymity and pseudonymity7 to enhance their privacy, anonymity
and pseudonimity can be used to foster criminal activity or shield
people from responsibility for their fraudulent statements. By the
simple expedient of using a domain name or e-mail address,
individuals and companies alike can assume a different and fictitious
persona. If an inability to track messages is desired, re-mailing
technologies and services are readily available.8 As evidence of
877, 894 (1963) ("[T]he theory of freedom of expression is a sophisticated and even
complex one. It does not come naturally to the ordinary citizen but needs to be learned.
It must be restated and reiterated not only for each generation, but for each new
situation."); see also Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Autonomy, and Accountability:
Challenges to the First Amendment in Cyberspace, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1647 (1995) ("The
critical question is whether 'new wine can be poured successfully into an old bottle,' or
whether new legal norms must be devised for the governance of the Networld.").
6. For a discussion of the potential for fraud on the Internet, see Federal Trade
Commission, Fighting Consumer Fraud: New Tools of the Trade (Apr. 1998); Federal
Trade Commission, FTC Names Its Dirty Dozen, 12 Scams Most Likely to Arrive Via Bulk
Email (July 1998); Federal Trade Commission, Dot Cons (Oct. 2000) (copies on file with
author). See also Fraud on the Internet: Scams Affecting Consumers: Hearings Before the
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs,
United States Senate, 105th Cong. (1998) and the "Internet Fraud Watch" website, at
http://www.fraud.org/internet/intset.htm (last visited March 10, 2002).
For an interesting case study of the inaccuracies of online discussions groups, see LAURA
J. GURAK, PERSUASION AND PRIVACY IN CYBERSPACE (Yale University Press 1997)
(detailing the history of the Lotus Marketplace and Clipper Chip proposals) ("The Market
Place and Clipper cases illustrate how closed communities enhance the spread of
inaccurate information and how ethos easily becomes dominant in cyberspace.").
7. "Anonymity" is used herein as it has been used by the U.S. Supreme Court to
refer both to anonymous speech (speech without any identity) and pseudonymous speech
(speech under a fictitious name). Although some commentators have noted that there are
different forms of anonymity, see Noah Levine, Note, Establishing Legal Accountability
For Anonymous Communication in Cyberspace, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1526, 1528-37 (1996)
(distinguishing between "apparent anonymity" (anonymous or pseudonymous
communications that can be traced) and "true anonymity" (anonymous communications
that cannot be traced)) and L. Detweiler, Identity, Privacy and Anonymity on the Internet,
available at http://www.rewi.hu-berlin.de/jura/proj/dsi /Netze/privint.html (last visited Oct.
23, 2002), the term is used herein to refer to all forms of anonymity and pseudonymity
unless otherwise noted.
8. For a description of various forms of anonymity on the Internet and the
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fraudulent activity on the Internet accumulates and unsolicited e-
mails become more intrusive, consumer groups and individuals will
pressure Congress and the state legislatures to "do something." A
potential solution is to enact a law that requires individuals and
companies who engage in Internet advertising9 to disclose their
correct legal identities and principal place of business.' ° Not only will
technological means of assuring such anonymity, see Flood Control, supra, note 5 at 414-
427; Detweiler, supra note 7; the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC), Guide to
Practical Privacy Tools, at http://www.epic.org/privacy/tools.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2002); and Levine, supra note 7. As Detweiler explained:
Simply stated, anonymity is the absence of identity, the ultimate in privacy.
However, there are several variations on the simple theme. A person may wish
to be consistently identified by a certain pseudonym or 'handle' and establish a
reputation under it in some area, providing pseudo-anonymity. A person may
wish to be completely untraceable for a single one-way message (a sort of 'hit-
and-run'). Or, a person may wish to be openly anonymous but carry on a
conversation with others (with either known or anonymous identities) via an
,anonymous return address.' A user may wish to appear as a 'regular user' but
actually be untraceable.
Detweiler, supra note 7, section 3.1.
Levine described re-mailing technology as follows:
The tool by which true anonymity is achieved in cyberspace is the anonymous
remailer .... A person who wants to send an anonymous e-mail or post an
anonymous message to a news group sends it to the anonymous remailer, which
strips the message of the identity and digital address of the original sender and
then "remails" it to the location specified by the sender.
Levine, supra note 7, at 1531.
9. For an overview of Internet advertising strategies, see BARBARA K. KAYE &
NORMAN J. MEDOFF, JUST A CLICK AWAY, ADVERTISING ON THE INTERNET (Allyn
and Bacon 2001); THOMAS J. KUEGLER, JR., WEB ADVERTISING AND MARKETING,
MAKE THE WEB WORK FOR YOU (Prima Tech, 3d ed. 2000); ROBIN ZEFF & BRAD
ARONSON, ADVERTISING ON THE INTERNET (2d. ed. Wiley 1999); and ADVERTISING
AND THE WORLD WIDE WEB (David W. Schumann and Esther Thorson eds., Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates 1999). The term "Internet" refers to "the linked computer network
where information is freely exchanged worldwide," Just A Click Away, supra at 2, and for
purposes of this article includes all forms of advertising over such network. For a more
technical definition, see Internet Society, All About The Internet: History of the Internet, at
http://www.isoc.org/ internet/history/brief.shtml (last visited March 10, 2002), wherein it is
noted that on October 24, 1995 the Federal Networking Council unanimously passed a
resolution defining the term "Internet" as the following:
[T]he global information system that - (i) is logically linked together by a
globally unique address space based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its
subsequent extensions/follow-ons; (ii) is able to support communications using
the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its
subsequent extensions/follow-ons, and/other IP-compatible protocols; and (iii)
provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, high level services
layered on the communications and related infrastructure described herein.
Id.
10. Several of the early efforts to regulate unsolicited e-mail have included mandated
disclosure requirements. For instance, as originally introduced, the State of Washington's
"Commercial E-Mail Regulation Act," House Bill 1037, § 2(1)(c), Pike & Fischer.
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a law of this sort provide consumers with critical information upon
which to make better decisions but it will also provide law
enforcement with the means to both identify and prosecute Internet
con artists.
As with recent Congressional efforts to protect children from
pornographic web sites and advertisements" and a state's attempt to
regulate unsolicited e-mails (also known as "spam"),"2 any effort to
restrict anonymous Internet speech is likely to be challenged on First
Amendment grounds. 3 Based principally on the U.S. Supreme
Court's existing commercial speech jurisprudence, I argue in Section
IV of this article that a law that bans anonymous Internet advertising
Internet Law & Regulation, Laws & Policy, IC-665-671, at
http://internetlaw.pf.com/html/newallprimarysourcedocuments-cr.asp (last visited Oct. 29,
2002), contained a provision that made it unlawful for anyone who initiated the
transmission of a commercial electronic mail message from a computer located in the
State of Washington or to a resident of the State of Washington to fail to prominently
display prescribed identifying information, including the name and address of the person
initiating the message. As adopted and now in effect, however, the law only requires that
unsolicited e-mail messages not contain false or misleading information in the subject line
and not use a third party's Internet domain without their permission. See WASH. REV.
CODE ANN. § 19.190.020(1) (West 2002). A Nevada statute provides, among other things,
that it is unlawful to transmit electronic mail if the person knows or has reason to know
that it contains false information concerning the identity of the sender or the source of the
transmission. 11 NEV. REV. STAT. § 205.49.
The Directive on Distance Contracts of the European Parliament and Council of the
European Union, Directive 97/7/EC, May 20, 1997, Article 4, Pike & Fischer, supra at IC-
587-595, in pertinent part, provides that "in good time prior to the conclusion of any
distance contract, the consumer shall be provided with the following information: (a) the
identity of the supplier and, in the case of contracts requiring payment in advance, his
address ......
11. See, e.g., ACLU v. Reno, 521 U.S. 844 (1997) (involving the Communications
Decency Act of 1996, part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-104, 110
Stat. 56, specifically 47 U.S.C §§ 223(a) and 223(d) (1994 ed., Supp. II)); Ashcroft v.
ACLU, 5535 U.S. 564 (2002)(involving the Child Online Protection Act of 1998, Pub. L.
105-227, 112 Stat. 2681 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 231); Free Speech Coalition v.
Reno, 198 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 1999) (involving the Child Pornography Prevention Act of
1996, Pub. L. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-26, specifically 18 U.S.C. § 2256(8)).
12. ACLU of Ga. v. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228 (N.D. Ga. 1997).
13. The First Amendment to the United States Constitution states: "Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech or the press; or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances." The
guarantees of the First Amendment are made applicable to the States pursuant to the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. See Gitlow v. N.Y., 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
See generally, Note, Developments in the Law - The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L.
REV. 1574 (1999) and I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for "Cyberspace," 55 U.
PITT. L. REV. 993 (1994).
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would not be held unconstitutional on free speech grounds."
Additional arguments in support of my position are provided by a
number of the Supreme Court's "mandated disclosure" and "direct
solicitation" cases and by the captive audience doctrine. Finally,
using the three methods of analysis employed by the majority,
concurring and dissenting opinions in McIntyre, I predict that the
constitutional right of anonymity will not be extended to commerce
and, therefore, that such right will not be an obstacle to a law that
bans anonymous Internet advertising.
II. Why is Anonymous E-Commerce an Issue?
Before taking action to curb anonymous e-commerce, Congress
and the state legislatures will first have to conclude that it is a
problem worthy of a legislative solution. To the casual observer, the
notion that an individual or company will engage in anonymous
transactions may seem absurd. Rational, intelligent people normally
are reluctant to deal with someone they cannot identify, so the
impetus for disclosures of identity is strong, at least among reputable
businesses. Like their "brick-and-mortar" brethren, most online
merchants are reputable business people who have no intent to
defraud their customers." For the majority of online transactions
then, anonymity will not be an issue. Sellers of goods and services,
particularly those that own well-known trademarks and service
marks, understand that the disclosure of their identities will often
help them to sell their products and services. Despite the obvious
value to consumers and merchants of identifying disclosures, there
are a number of reasons why anonymous commerce will be more
prevalent in cyberspace 6 than in "meatspace."' 7 Consequently, it is
14. Efforts by states to regulate Internet activities have also been attacked on the
basis of the dormant Commerce Clause. The question raised in such cases is whether the
state law is "designed to benefit in-state economic interests by burdening out-of-state
competitors." New Energy Co. of Ind. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 272-73 (1987). See also
Am. Libraries Ass'n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (New York state law
regulating offensive communications on the Internet struck down on dormant Commerce
Clause grounds because it was found to "unduly burden interstate commerce").
15. The term "brick and mortar" is used herein to refer to traditional retail outlets
with one or more physical locations.
16. As used herein, "cyberspace" is defined as an "imagined place where electronic
data goes; the notional realm in which electronic information exists or is exchanged."
ENCARTA DICTIONARY, at http://dictionary.msn.com/find/entry.asp? search=cyberspace
(last visited Dec. 31, 2001).
17. "Meatspace" is a recently coined word that is popular among computer hackers
and other aficionados of the Internet and is defined as the "place where people actually
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only a matter of time before Congress and the states seek to ban
anonymous Internet advertising in one form or another.
In meat space, we tend to undervalue our ability to identify
individuals and companies with whom we conduct business. This is
mainly due to the many daily interactions that we engage in on a face-
to-face basis. When we walk into a store and purchase groceries, we
assume that the store will be there the next day, week or month. If
we have a problem with the goods we purchased, we can exchange
them or return them for a refund. Most of us do not know the exact
identities of the individuals or corporations that own our local grocery
store, drycleaners or gas station, but we are comfortable conducting
business with them because we assume that we can locate the
identities of the owners if and when the need arises. We can search
local business license records or simply visit the business
establishment and ask to speak to the owner. Thus, when it comes to
knowing the identities of local business owners, we accept a certain
amount of anonymity because their physical presence in our
communities gives us a sense of security.
The sense of security that comes from physically seeing and
visiting a business establishment does not exist in cyberspace. Indeed,
the Internet has eliminated many of the traditional indicia of
reliability that business owners and consumers use to determine new
business relationships. 8 If you want to conduct business on the
meet: a place where people physically meet and interact, as contrasted with cyberspace."
Id. at http://dictionary.msn.com/find/entry.asp?search=meat space (last visited Dec. 31,
2001). The hackers' definition of meat space is as follows:
"Meatspace" is "the physical world, where the meat lives - as opposed to
cyberspace." "Cyberspace" is "1. Notional 'information-space' loaded with
visual cues and navigable with brain-computer interfaces called 'cyberspace-
decks'. 2. The Internet or Matrix as a whole, considered a crude cyberspace
.... Although this usage became widely popular in the mainstream press during
1994 when the Internet exploded into public awareness, it is strongly deprecated
among hacker's because the Internet does not meet the high SF-inspired
standard they have for true cyberspace technology. Thus, this use of the term
usually tags a wannabe or outsider."
THE JARGON DICTIONARY, at http://info.astrian.net/jargon (Jargon File 4.2.2, 20 Aug.
2000) (last visited Dec. 31, 2002).
18. See David B. Whittle's "Cyberspace: The Human Dimension":
In the traditional world, we rarely communicate with anyone in a truly
anonymous fashion. Although we contact strangers regularly in the course of our
daily business, they are almost always clearly associated with the business or
organization they represent. We can usually ask for or track down a name or
otherwise trace responsibility if we choose to or need to. Visually, we are
accustomed to devices such as uniforms, signs, nametags, and labels to reduce
levels of uncertainty when we deal with strangers.
In cyberspace, there are fewer signals or devices, and some long-time denizens of
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Internet, particularly if your intent is to engage in fraud, there may be
no need for a fancy office, retail store, or a large staff. 9 You can
establish a sophisticated Internet presence with minimal physical
space and few, if any, employees."
On the Internet, it is also possible to launch online advertising
with very little capital.2 In meat space, the costs of printing and
postage, the expense of maintaining telemarketing facilities and
employees, and the time-consuming nature of door-to-door
cyberspace are often reluctant to provide them, believing that individuals should
be judged by the quality of their ideas and expression rather than by the more
traditional trappings of appellation and association.
DAVID B. WHITFLE, CYBERSPACE: THE HUMAN DIMENSION, 117-118 (W.H. Freeman
1997). See also Al Teich, Mark S. Frankel, Rob Kling & Ya-ching Lee, Anonymous
Communication Policies for the Internet: Results and Recommendations of the AAAS
Conference, The Information Society, 15:71-77, 72 (1999) ("In face-to-face interaction, we
have visual and auditory clues about the person we encounter. In online interaction,
however, the text-based content lacks many of the cues on which we normally rely, and
our common sense might mislead us.").
19. As noted in a report by the Federal Trade Commission:
With a telephone or an online link, fraudulent marketers can set up shop quickly
and cheaply and move without a trace: The fraudulent telemarketer, for
example, can use pay phones and obtain payment through wired funds or credit
card advances - with no listed or traceable phone, no mailbox, and no office. For
the cyber scam artist, it may be even easier to escape detection.
Federal Trade Commission, Anticipating the 21st Century: Consumer Protection Policy in
the New High-Tech Global Marketplace, Vol. II, at 4 (1996).
20. See Fighting Consumer Fraud, supra note 6, Executive Summary:
Since the days of snake oil salesmen and medicine shows, fraud operators have
appealed to consumers' concerns about health, financial security, and social
acceptance. Today's con artists are pitching surefire cures, easy money, and self-
improvement, but they're no longer confined to traditional venues to perpetrate
frauds. The Internet is now mainstream, and it is allowing fraud promoters to
mimic legitimate business more convincingly - and reach potential victims more
efficiently - than ever.
In July of 1998 the FTC issued a consumer alert in which it named the twelve most likely
e-mail scams. See FTC Names Its Dirty Dozen, supra note 6. In its publication entitled
"DOT CONS" the Federal Trade Commission warns: "[C]on artists have gone high-tech,
using the Internet to defraud consumers in a variety of clever ways." Supra note 6, at 1.
21. "It doesn't take much to set up a base of operation on the World Wide Web: a
personal computer, a modem, a little software - all of which can be bought new for under
$1000 - and an Internet connection, which costs $30 or less a month." Federal Trade
Commission, Anticipating the 21st Century, supra note 19, at 24. It has been estimated that
the cost of Internet advertising can run anywhere from $1500 to $1.5 million annually or
more. See, KUEGLER, supra note 9, Chapter 20. Unlike direct mail advertising where
printing and postage are the most expensive costs, the principal costs associated with an e-
mail advertising campaign relate to the acquisition and maintenance of e-mail lists. Also,
individuals and companies who advertise on the Internet and who are conducting
legitimate businesses must make the expenditures that are necessary to establish an
infrastructure to fill customer orders in a timely fashion.
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solicitations act as natural limits on the extent of potential fraud.22 In
contrast, once an Internet sales campaign is developed, the
incremental costs to send solicitations to thousands, if not millions, of
Internet users is marginal. Moreover, you need not subject the
content of your advertising to scrutiny by third parties. Unlike
companies who purchase print, radio and television advertisements, if
you choose to establish your own web site or engage in e-mail
solicitations you can do so without paying someone else for the
placement of your advertisements.23
In addition to enabling a reduced physical presence and
otherwise reducing traditional indicia of reliability, the Internet has
exponentially increased the ability of individuals and companies to
conduct business in ways that reduce direct contact between one
22. The regulatory pressures resulting from an increase in Internet advertising are not
unlike the regulatory pressures that state legislatures faced in the late 1940's and early
1950's when society became less rural and more concentrated. As described in Breard v.
Alexandria, concerns were raised at that time about a new method of business: door-to-
door solicitation. Breard, 341 U.S. 622 (1951). Then, as now, there was a perceived need
to protect the privacy of one's home and concern that door-to-door sales operations would
replace brick-and-mortar establishments. Id.
23. The involvement of third parties such as traditional media outlets and the U.S.
Postal Service in the reduction of advertising fraud in meat space is significant. Although
by statute newspapers, magazines, radio stations and television stations often are not
responsible for the defamatory or fraudulent statements of their advertisers, they
obviously exercise a measure of control over the activities of such advertisers. First, they
can refuse to print advertisements that they find inappropriate or offensive. Second, and
perhaps more importantly, because they want to get paid for the advertising space they
provide they will refuse to conduct business with individuals and companies that do not
have the financial means to pay for their services. The U.S. Postal Service is specifically
authorized to withhold the delivery of mail under certain circumstances. See generally 39
U.S.C. § 3001, et seq. Of particular significance to the topic of this article is 39 U.S.C. §
3003(a) which provides, in pertinent part that:
Upon evidence satisfactory to the Postal Service that any person is using a
fictitious, false, or assumed name, title, or address in conducting, promoting, or
carrying on or assisting therein, by means of the postal services of the United
States an activity in violation of sections 1302 [making it a crime to mail lottery
tickets or related matter], 1341 [making it a crime to engage in mail fraud], and
1343 [making it a crime to engage in wire fraud] of title 18, it may -
(1) withhold the mail so addressed from delivery; and
(2) require the party claiming the mail to furnish proof to it of the claimant's
identity and right to receive the mail.
Unfortunately, although those who engage in fraud on the Internet may be charged with
wire fraud pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 1343, neither the U.S. Postal Service nor any other
entity of the U.S. government has practical, direct control over the delivery of Internet
messages. The Internet eliminates an important means of controlling advertising fraud by
enabling Internet advertisers to act unilaterally without the unofficial oversight of third
party vendors or the official oversight of the U.S. Postal Service or a similar government
agency.
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another. As with the expansion of the railroads, improvements to
mail service,2' and the development of the telegraph and the
telephone,25 the Internet has enabled the further decentralization of
21business and a corresponding increase in remote contracting.
Remote contracting has existed for centuries, but the Internet makes
it much easier for individuals and companies to purchase goods and
services from businesses that are located around the world.
The Internet also makes it possible for online businesses to exist
one day and be gone the next." It is no wonder that in advising
consumers how to shop safely online, the United States Federal
Trade Commission ("FTC") has said: "Anyone can set up shop online
under almost any name. If you're not familiar with a merchant, ask
for a paper catalog or brochure to get a better idea of their
merchandise and services."'  In urging consumers to ask online
merchants for a paper brochure, the FTC has expressly recognized
the importance of knowing the identities and legitimacy of the
individuals and companies with whom one does business. Implicitly,
the FTC has recognized that the nature of the Internet is likely to
increase the prevalence of anonymous interaction.
One reason for the increase in anonymous interaction is the
Internet custom of encouraging anonymity. From its early days, when
the Internet was just a tool for communicating information and ideas
24. For a history of U.S. mail service, see CARL H. SCHEELE, WITH THE
COLLABERATION OF CONSTANCE MINKIN, NEITHER SNOW NOR RAIN... : THE STORY
OF THE UNITED STATES MAILS (Smithsonian Institutional Press 1970).
25. Commenting on the parallels between the Internet and the telegraph in his book,
Tom Standage said:
The telegraph.., made possible new business practices, facilitating the rise of
large companies centrally controlled from a head office. Today, the Internet
once again promises to redefine the way people work, through emerging trends
like teleworking (working from a distant location, with a network connection to
one's office) and virtual corporations (where there is no central office, just a
distributed group of employees who communicate over a network).
TOM SANDAGE, THE vICrORIAN INTERNET, 210 (Berkeley Books 1998).
26. As used herein, the term "remote contracting" refers to a contractual relationship
that is entered into between individuals and companies who do not or cannot meet face-
to-face.
27. Commissioner Thomas B. Leary, Federal Trade Commission, Unofficial Remarks
to Various Marketing Groups, The Two Faces of Electronic Commerce (2000) ("[E]-
commerce lends itself so readily to one-time promotions, where inaccurate information is
not subject to normal market disciplines.").
28. Federal Trade Commission, Shop Safely Online (2001).
29. Id.
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among scientists, Internet users have used pseudonymous names."
This practice has since been adopted by millions of individuals in the
selection of e-mail addresses and domain names and has been carried
over into e-commerce' When selecting domain names, established
businesses frequently use made-up or shortened names that may bear
little resemblance to their legal names.32 Or in order to attract a
broader audience to their websites, they may use a generic name such
as "www.cars.com." While identifying information about a company
can frequently be found somewhere on its web site, such information
is often not obvious and may be outdated. E-mail presents similar
but more troubling problems because the "from" or "subject" lines
are frequently designed as the "hook" to get recipients to open an e-
mail and fictitious names are often utilized in e-mail messages for
misleading purposes."
Advances in technology are also likely to increase the incidence
of anonymous commerce on the Internet. In fact, technologies and
businesses have been developed for the specific purpose of allowing
30. For a history of the Internet, see Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. at 849-853; KAYE &
MEDOFF, supra, note 9, at 2-4; Harvard Law Review Association Developments in the Law
- The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574 (1999); and PBS, Life on the Internet:
Net Timeline, at http://www.pbs.org/internet/timeline/ timeline-txt.html (last visited March
10, 2002). For a summary of the historical use of anonyms and pseudonyms and efforts by
bibliographers to discover the true identities of anonymous authors, see ARCHER TAYLOR
& FREDRIC J. MOSHER, THE BIBLIOGRAPHICAL HISTORY OF ANONYMA AND
PSEUDONYMA (University of Chicago Press 1951).
31. Early rules governing the Internet prohibited it from being used for commercial
purposes. See Life on the Internet: Net Timeline, supra note 30 ("1991-1993[:]
Corporations wishing to use the Internet face a serious problem; commercial network
traffic is banned from the National Science Foundation's NSFNET, the backbone of the
Internet. In 1991 the NSF lifts the restriction on commercial use, clearing the way for the
age of electronic commerce.").
32. I do not mean to suggest that all individuals and companies who use
pseudonymous names are engaging in fraud. I suspect that most Internet users, like most
people, are law-abiding citizens. But because the use of pseudonyms is so prevalent and
accepted on the Internet, those individuals and companies who engage in fraudulent
activity on the Internet are not as obvious or as easy to detect as they are in the physical
world.
33. ADVERTISING AND THE WORLD WIDE WEB, supra note 9, Chapter 13, at 331
("In general ,. . e-mail marketing is almost always geared to getting some kind of reaction
out of the reader. If present at all, branding plays only a limited role in e-mail
marketing."). While writing this article I periodically reviewed many of the e-mail
advertisements that I received and found that not only did the "from" and "re" lines of the
e-mail fail to identify the advertiser, but when I randomly opened various e-mail messages
there was often no identifying information in the form of either a brand name or a trade
name.
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Internet users to hide their identities.34  Known variously as
"anonymizers," "anonymity service providers," and "re-mailers,"
these services make communication difficult to trace and allow
Internet users to visit websites and send e-mail communications
without revealing their true identities.35 Moreover, these services are
marketed and packaged in a way that makes the available
technologies easy to obtain and use. Although these services are a
great way to encourage free and open debate on important issues of
the day, they can also be used to hide the identities of those who are
engaged in fraudulent and criminal activities.
Another reason anonymous commerce is likely to be more
prevalent in cyberspace than in meat space is due to the
instantaneous nature of the Internet. Low transaction costs and
"click-to-agree" transactions have increased opportunities for fraud.
Unlike direct mail advertisements that require a buyer to take
multiple affirmative steps to conclude a transaction, e-mail and
website solicitations both encourage and enable instantaneous
action. 6 Typically, the recipient of a direct mail solicitation will read
the solicitation, fill-out a form if he decides to purchase the goods
being offered, write a check or provide a credit card number, put the
form in an envelope, put a stamp on the envelope, and mail the
envelope. At each step along the way, he can reconsider the wisdom
of the transaction. An online purchaser, on the other hand, can place
an order in a matter of minutes with little or no time to reconsider the
wisdom of the transaction.37 Usually the online purchaser will have
fully performed his end of the bargain by using a credit card or other
payment method38 to prepay for the goods purchased. Those people
34. For a discussion of the various technological means of protecting one's identity on
the Internet, see Detweiler, supra note 7; and Teich, Frankel, Kling & Lee, supra note 18.
35. See the websites Ultimate Anonymity at http://www.ultimate-anonymity.com and
Anonymizer.com at http://www.anonymizer.com/# for details on how easy and inexpensive
it is to use re-mailing services.
36. This is undoubtedly one reason why the European Union's Directive on Distance
Contracts provides consumers seven days in which to cancel a remote contract. See
Counsel Directive 97/7/EC, art. 6.1, On the Protection of Consumers in Respect of
Distance Contracts O.J. (C. 144) 19.22 (hereinafter the "EU's Distance Directive").
37. Placing an order via the telephone also lends itself to less circumspection than
having to fill out and mail a written form. For this reason, among others, telephone
solicitations are highly regulated. See Telephone Consumer Protection Act of 1991, 47
U.S.C. § 227 (2001).
38. Companies like PayPal and BillPoint provide online purchasers with a means of
paying for goods without the use a credit card and in some sense may provide such
purchasers with anonymity. But even if these alternative advance payment systems are
used, it is likely that the online purchaser will have to reveal some identifying information
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who engage in fraud through this type of high-speed transaction are
unlikely to disclose their correct legal identities.
The prevalence of anonymous commerce on the Internet gains
further support from the fact that many industry leaders and
commentators tout the importance of anonymity as a means of
encouraging the open exchange of ideas and information and as a tool
for protecting individual privacy. In a report following a conference
on "Anonymous Communication Policies For The Internet," the
American Association for the Advancement of Science stated that
"[a] fundamental perspective that was shared by virtually all
conference participants is that the ability to communicate
anonymously is a particularly valuable feature of the Internet and
that, as regulatory regimes and policies for Internet communication
evolve, efforts should be made to preserve it."39  Without
distinguishing the context of various Internet communications, the
report stated that "the consensus view of the conference was that the
positive value of anonymous communication more than offset [its]
dangers" and generally advocated a passive approach to the problems
posed by anonymity on the Internet. °
Finally, as usage of the Internet expands, it is reasonable to
foresee many more unsophisticated and potentially vulnerable
individuals getting online and becoming prey for unscrupulous
businessmen.41 Unfortunately, the technological sophistication of
computers and the Internet may lead the less sophisticated consumer
to believe that the Internet is highly regulated and to assume that
transactions that are proposed on the Internet have a high degree of
trustworthiness. The negative implications of this perception are
exacerbated by the fact that the Internet renders the use of
intermediaries unnecessary to publish advertisements, which thereby
eliminates a principal reason for society's acceptance of anonymity in
meat space. At the same time, the absence of intermediaries on the
Internet heightens the potential for fraud by eliminating the filtering
that now occurs with respect to print, television, and radio
advertising. In this environment, particularly given the absence of
face-to-face contact, the threat of fraud is great and anonymity is
such as an address where the goods are to be shipped.
39. Teich, Frankel, Kling & Lee, supra note 18, at 72.
40. Id. at 72-73.
41. A report of the U.S. Census Bureau issued in September 2001 indicated that as of
August 2000, fifty-four million households, or 51%, had one or more computers and that
41.5% of U.S. households had Internet access. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, HOME COMPUTERS AND INTERNET USE IN THE UNITED STATES (2001).
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likely to be a major tool of the defrauders.
III. The Benefits and Detriments of Anonymity as Applied to
E-commerce
Assuming, as I predict, that anonymous commerce will be
prevalent in cyberspace and that Congress and the states will act to
restrict anonymous Internet advertising, it will not be long before the
resulting laws will be challenged on the grounds that they violate the
free speech guarantee of the First Amendment. In defense of such
actions the governmental interests to be protected must be identified.
Obviously, the desire to prevent fraud will be a major motivating
factor behind any law that bans anonymous Internet advertising, but
in light of the importance of free speech, all of the potential
detriments of anonymity should be examined as possible justifications
for the challenged laws. In the following sections of this article, the
benefits and detriments of anonymity are examined generally, as they
apply to commerce, and from the perspective of a consumer.
A. The Benefits and Detriments of Anonymity Generally
Based upon the majority opinions in Talley v. California42 and
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commission,3 discussed in more detail in
Section V infra, there can be little doubt that anonymity is a highly
valued feature of American life in several contexts. It is highly valued
in the political realm as evidenced by the fact that both the Federalists
Papers and the Anti-Federalists' response thereto were published
under pseudonyms.' Anonymity is also highly valued in the literary
realm based on a belief, if not a fear, that many great works of
literature would not have been published if the authors' true
identities were readily known.45 But far from being a universally
recognized right, anonymity has been both valued and discouraged by
American society depending upon the circumstances of its use.46 For
instance, while anonymity is highly valued in the voting booth, it is
not valued when applied to juror votes." Similarly, while many
businesses see value in an anonymous suggestion box, anonymous
42. 362 U.S. 60 (1960).
43. 514 U.S. 334 (1995).
44. See id. at 343, n.6.
45. See id. at 343, n.4.
46. See generally Saul Levmore, The Anonymity Tool, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 2191
(1996).
47. Id. at 2193.
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notes exchanged among neighbors and friends are not as well
received.48 Politicians routinely view voter rolls for details - including
party registration, date of birth and ethnicity - that help them to
target their election activities, yet we often insist that teachers be
unaware of the identity of the student who wrote the exam they are
grading.
There are a number of reasons for the inconsistency in our views
toward anonymity.49 First, a person's decision to engage in anonymity
may be explained by a wide-array of motivations. For instance, using
anonymity with the intent to defraud is not acceptable. But,
anonymity that is engaged in unconsciously or with an innocent
motive, such as a desire to be judged on the merits of a work alone, is
more likely to be accepted. Second, we are more willing to accept
anonymity in situations where an intermediary is involved." Under
this view, the practice of publishing literary works under pseudonyms
is arguably explained as much by society's willingness to allow an
intermediary (the publisher) to vouch for the reliability of a work as it
is explained by a belief in a fundamental right of anonymity. Related
to this point is the observation, made earlier, that we are willing to
accept anonymity in situations where we are confident that we can
track down the true identity of the anonymous person or company if
the need arises. Finally, our views necessarily reflect a balancing of
the positive and negative aspects of anonymity." Where the negative
aspects of anonymity outweigh the positive aspects, we are more apt
to reject anonymity. For instance, it is more important for society to
have an accurate record of real property ownership than it is to
preserve the anonymity of real property owners.
The main benefit of anonymity, at least based upon the Supreme
Court's reasoning in Talley and its progeny, is its potential role in
promoting unfettered speech. In holding that anonymity is a
constitutional right, the Supreme Court in McIntyre identified a
48. Id.
49. For additional commentary on this topic, see Flood Control, supra note 5, at 402-
09.
50. The central premise of Levmore's article is "that anonymity is a less acceptable
social practice where the informer can use an intermediary to avoid confrontation with the
recipient and to convey information about the reliability of the source." Levmore, supra
note 46, at 2199.
51. Id. at 2193 ("Anonymity may encourage communication, but nonanonymity, or
identifiability, will often raise the value of a communication to its recipient."); see also
WHITTLE, supra note 18, at 83-84 (listing the benefits and detriments of the Internet). For
a discussion of a variety of conflicting issues raised by e-commerce, see Leary, supra note
27.
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number of justifications for anonymity, including: a fear of economic
or official retaliation; a fear of social ostracism; a desire to preserve
one's privacy; and a belief that ideas may be more persuasive when
anonymous. 2 Branscomb identified three additional situations in
which anonymity seems desirable: the asserted psychological benefits
of being able to assume different personae; the need to protect
confidential media sources; and the historical phenomenon and
benefits of pseudonymous authors. 3 The American Association for
the Advancement of Science ("AAAS") report cited the "positive
value" of anonymous Internet communications as the "freedom from
detection, retribution and embarrassment" that anonymity allows and
the concomitant belief that "anonymous communication encourages
Internet communications."54 The later factor relates to the concern
that people will not use the Internet unless their privacy is secured.
The view that anonymity is a tool for preserving one's privacy
appears to be fueled by a realization that improved computer
technologies and the Internet have greatly enhanced the ability of
companies to collect, retain and disseminate private information55 and
the belief that consumers should be empowered to take action to
protect their own privacy interests. Both the long-term existence of
the Direct Marketing Association56 and the mass of junk mail that
most Americans receive attest to the fact that personal information
about American consumers has been collected and used for a long
time, but the Internet enhances the ways in which this information
can be collected and used. There is a concern that as Internet users
52. 514 U.S. at 341-42.
53. Branscomb, supra note 5, at 1642.
54. Teich, Frankel, Kling & Lee, supra note 18, at 71.
55. Leary, supra note 27, at 2:
Internet technology not only provides a record of consumers' actual purchases
but information about their decision-making processes as well. It is as if you
could follow consumers through a supermarket and record not only the products
they actually bought but also the other products that caught their eye. A closer
analogy might be close observation of a customer while browsing a bookstore as
well as while paying for purchases on the way out.
56. According to its website, the Direct Marketing Association was founded in 1917
and is "the oldest and largest trade association for users and suppliers in the direct
database and interactive marketing fields:' http://www.the-dma.org (last visited March 26,
2002).
57. For a fuller description of the ways in which computer technologies and the
Internet enhance the collection and dissemination of information, see Julie E. Cohen, A
Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at "Copyright Management" in Cyberspace,
28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996). See also Tattered Cover, Inc. v. City of Thornton, 44 P.3d
1044 (non-final version subject to revision) (Sup. Ct. Colo. Apr. 8, 2002) (recognizing a
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engage in e-commerce, information about their buying habits will be
used in an inappropriate manner.8 Many consumers have a
compelling interest in keeping details about what they purchase
confidential for fear of embarrassment, retaliation, or ostracism. It
is argued that anonymity allows consumers to engage in e-commerce
in a way that prevents purchases from being directly attributed to
them.
Balanced against the asserted benefits of anonymity on the
Internet are society's interest in preventing fraud and other wrongful
behavior. The concern is that anonymity enables fraud and
eliminates or substantially reduces the amount of information about
one's actions and reputation that is available or traceable. As
Branscomb explained in the context of anonymous Internet
communications: "[d]isguising the sources of messages or postings
relieves their authors from responsibility for any harm that may
ensue. This often encourages outrageous behavior without any
opportunity for recourse to the law for redress of grievances.""
Froomkin stated: "Anonymity, like other forms of personal control
over information threatens to make access to those 'external facts' on
which people rely more difficult" and that the "damage to society's
ability to redress legitimate claims is, the strongest moral objection to
constitutional right to read anonymously).
58. Flood Control, supra note 5, at 407-08.
Ironically, the same anonymity that is blamed for undermining the accountability
necessary for the security of the home/fortress may turn out to be the tool that
the inhabitants of the home need to level the playing field against corporations
and governments that might seek to use new data processing and data collection
tools in ways that constrain the citizen's transactional or political freedom.
Id. However, although many believe that providing privacy on the Internet is critical to
the future of e-commerce, it can also be argued that e-commerce will not flourish if it is
seen as a place of rampant fraud. See Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 458
(1978) (noting that some forms of speech may actually "disserve the individual and
societal interest ... in facilitating informed and reliable decision making").
Even among consumers, privacy is not the only concern that is posed by the Internet. As
noted by Leary in his article:
Polls show that privacy is the number one concern, but large numbers of regular
Internet users say they still would not make significant purchases through the
medium even if their privacy concerns could be met. They are worried that if
they do not know who they are dealing with and do not feel confident that they
will get what they have paid for.
Leary, supra note 27, at 2.
59. For instance, an employee of Microsoft may not want it known that he recently
bought an Apple Computer or a person who suffers from incontinence may not want it
known that she buys special undergarments.
60. Branscomb, supra note 5, at 1642-1643.
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the increase in anonymous interaction."6 In an article on the right of
privacy that pre-dates the advent of Internet-based e-commerce,
Posner observed that secrecy is not a good thing if "it serves to
conceal facts about an individual that, if known to others, would
cause them to lower their valuation of him as an employee, borrower,
friend, spouse, or other transactor." 62
In the above-referenced AAAS report, it is acknowledged that
"[w]hile many people believe that anonymous communication on the
Internet is not only acceptable but has positive value, others see risk
in it because anonymous users are not accountable for their
behavior."63 The challenge, according to the AAAS report is "[t]o
address the problem of how to foster socially-desirable uses of
anonymous communication online while discouraging undesirable
uses."'  This, of course, cannot be done without considering the
context and nature of the anonymous communication. For present
purposes, we must determine whether anonymity is and should be
valued in the commercial realm and the extent to which our interest
in improving online privacy outweighs our need to reduce Internet
fraud.65 For reasons that are explained in the sections that follow,
when a ban on anonymity is directed at sellers of goods and services,
the public's interest in preventing fraud and being informed of basic
identifying information should prevail over concerns about privacy.
61. Flood Control, supra note 5, at 405-06.
62. Richard A. Posner, Privacy, Secrecy & Reputation, 28 BuFF. L. REV. 1, 2 (1979).
63. Teich, Frankel, Kling & Lee, supra note 18, at 71.
64. Id. at 71-72.
65. As Spiros Simitis noted in Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society:
Because the existence of a democratic society depends essentially on an
uninhibited proliferation of information, privacy very quickly became one of the
main objects of debate. In fact, free speech has been seen, to a substantial
extent, as a product of the constant adjustment of boundary between the
individual's right to be let alone and the public's need to be informed.
Spiros Simitis, Reviewing Privacy in an Information Society, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 707, 731-
732 (Mar. 1987). See also Mark S. Nadel, Rings of Privacy: Unsolicited Telephone Calls
and the Right of Privacy, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 99(1986) (making the same point with respect
to the regulation of unsolicited telephone calls):
The reasonableness of a restriction on speech to protect privacy depends to a
great extent on the strength of the privacy interest involved. Decisions in this
area have identified two factors for measuring the strength of the claimed privacy
interest: the forum in which the challenged communication is received and the
nature of the communication. Privacy interests are strongest in the home.
Id. at 101.
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B. The Benefits and Detriments of Anonymity In Commerce
Although the value of anonymity may be clear in the literary and
political realms, it is murky in the commercial realm.' The benefits of
anonymity identified above do not seem to apply to commercial
transactions or, at least, they are not so critical that we should exalt
anonymity over traditional notions of contract and commercial law.
Although sellers of goods may fear a loss of business for selling
unpopular goods or services and may therefore prefer to be
anonymous, the messages that naturally flow from the type of goods
or services sold are precisely the type of information that consumers
need. Thus, a consumer's choice not to frequent a business because
he does not know the business or it has a bad reputation is a decision
we readily accept in our free market economy.
When engaging in a transaction, the identity of the person or
company from whom one purchases goods or services is and always
has been an important fact to consider. If you contract to build a
house, the identity of the builder allows you to determine if the
builder is a licensed contractor. If you contract to purchase a washer
and dryer, the identity of the manufacturer and retailer allow you to
determine the quality of the goods. If you have a preference for
goods made in a particular country or you only want to buy services
from local companies, knowledge of the identity of the sellers of such
goods and services allows you to exercise your preference. Among
other things, the identity and reputation of individuals and companies
is often the critical factor in determining the price one is willing to
pay for goods and services. In the parlance of economists, the more
information that is known about a given transaction, the more likely it
is that the parties to the transaction will act efficiently.67
Perhaps the only interest that supports anonymity in the
commercial realm is our relatively newfound interest in commercial
privacy.' Traditionally, as we have gone about our daily lives, we
have given little thought to what information about us is collected and
how it is used. For years we have purchased goods using credit cards
and filled-out warranty registration forms, but we have seldom, if
66. See infra Part VI. A. and B. for a discussion of anonymity at the time of the
adoption of the Bill of Rights.
67. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality, Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q. J. Econ. 488 (1970).
68. A number of consumer groups have been concerned about privacy issues for
decades but it seems that it has only recently reached the level of widespread public
consciousness.
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ever, stopped to wonder what is done with the information we
provided. We are rightly concerned about making sure that private
information about us is not used inappropriately.69 Computer
technologies have greatly increased the amount of information that
can be collected and stored. The same technology has also improved
the means and speed at which such information can be disseminated
and searched. But before we conclude that anonymity is a preferred
means of securing privacy in e-commerce, we need to balance our
interest in privacy against the importance of full disclosure in
commercial transactions." Focusing on the seller of goods and
services, the interest in privacy is simply not that strong because
corporations and other forms of business (the targets of any law that
would ban anonymous Internet advertisements) do not enjoy the
same right of privacy that is enjoyed by individuals.71 In deciding to
conduct business online, or elsewhere, businesses should understand
69. Legislative efforts to restrict the use of private information that has been collected
legally by individuals and companies may present their own First Amendment problems.
See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling
Implication of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049
(2000). Thus, rather than attempting to regulate the use of such information, a better
approach may be to restrict the collection of the information in the first place, for instance
by precluding the collection of information unless it is provided voluntarily. At a
minimum, and consistent with the "full disclosure" theme of this article, consumers should
be provided with advance notice of the information that is being collected and how it will
be used and should be able to object to the sale of personally identifiable information to
third parties. It has also been suggested that because many online consumers do not have
sufficient bargaining power, a default rule should be established forbidding certain
activities with respect to collected data unless specific authorization has been obtained.
See Pamela Samuelson, Privacy As Intellectual Property?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1125, 1151
(2000); see also Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as
Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1409 (2000) (suggesting that "traditional modes of First
Amendment review should not apply in the same way, or at all, to regulation of
commercial processing of personal information").
70. Commenting on privacy in cyberspace, Epstein has observed that "'[j]ust as with
the rise of the camera and the parabolic microphone, the law must resolve a permanent
tension between two ideals [privacy and full disclosure], each of which seems to be
unexceptional until placed in juxtaposition to the other." Richard A. Epstein, Privacy,
Publication, and the First Amendment: The Dangers of First Amendment Exceptionalism,
52STAN. L. REV. 1003, 1004 (2000).
71. U.S. v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1950) (internal citations omitted):
Although the 'right to be let alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men,' . .. is not confined literally to searches and
seizures as such, but extends as well to the orderly taking under compulsion of
process,... neither incorporated nor unincorporated associations can plead an
unqualified right to conduct their affairs in secret.
Id. at 651-652. See also Richard A. Posner, The Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REV. 393, 399
(1978) (discussing the need to differentiate between individual and organizational privacy
and the fact that privacy in commerce is not generally tolerated).
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that they have little, if any, privacy rights.
Balanced against the legitimate interest of securing privacy on
the Internet is the need to curb Internet fraud and criminal activity.72
Obviously, to the extent they are the perpetrators of fraud,
corporations and other businesses have no legitimate interest in
hiding their identities.73 But even if sellers of goods and services are
legitimate, anonymity in Internet advertising denies consumers
critical information at a significant point in a transaction: before the
consumer decides to make a purchase or initiate contact.74 Although
legitimate businesses that engage in anonymous Internet advertising
will presumably reveal their correct identities in the electronic or
written documents that are issued as part of a completed sales
transaction, consumers need to know the precise identity and location
of the individual or company long before they press the "enter" or
"submit" button that causes their electronic transaction to be
processed. In an environment where courts appear more and more
willing to enforce contract terms that were not disclosed to consumers
until after an order is placed and payment is made, the need for up-
front information about the identity of the seller is particularly
compelling.75
72. A conflict between free speech and privacy interests has frequently arisen in the
First Amendment context. See Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 208 (1975)
and cases cited therein. . What is interesting about the debate concerning anonymous
Internet communications is that the normal free speech/privacy dichotomy is turned on its
head. Instead of privacy being used as a justification for the regulation of speech (i.e., the
law is needed to protect the sanctity of one's home), it is used as an argument for why
anonymous speech should not be regulated (i.e., anonymity on the Internet is needed so
individuals can protect their privacy).
73. As noted above, businesses have an obvious incentive to identify themselves. For
a variety of reasons, however, even legitimate businesses do not always identify
themselves by their correct legal name. First, they may use a trademark or other fictitious
name as a shorthand for their legal name (e.g., "IBM" instead of International Business
Machines or "3M" instead of Minnesota, Mining and Manufacturing). Second, for tax or
other reasons, they may be organized into multiple business entities (e.g., Enron) but
present themselves to the public in such a way that consumers do not know that they are
dealing with different legal entities.
74. As is discussed in Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., the point in time when
one is required to disclose his identity may be critical to the First Amendment analysis.
Buckley, 525 U.S. 182, 198 (1999). Unlike political speech where early disclosure of
identity may chill speech, in the commercial realm, early identification is needed to make
fraud prevention efforts effective.
75. See, e.g., Brower v. Gateway, 676 N.Y.S. 2d 569 (App. Div. 1998); ProCD, Inc. v.
Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147
(7th Cir. 1997). See also Jean Braucher, Delayed Disclosure in Consumer E-commerce as
an Unfair and Deceptive Practice, 46 WAYNE L. REV. 1805 (2000). But see Specht v.
Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F. 3d 17 (2nd Cir. 2002) (holding an online "browse-
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As noted above, as long as means exist for individuals and
businesses to easily trace the correct legal identity of a company - for
instance by knowing the physical location of a company and then
searching the corporate records, business licenses and fictitious name
filings for that locale - we have tolerated a certain degree of
anonymity when it comes to the identification of businesses. The
further decentralization of business and the potential absence of a
physical presence engendered by the Internet heighten the need for
more direct identification requirements. Rather than placing the
burden on consumers to trace the identities of businesses by searching
a web site or scattered government filings,76 I think we should require
Internet advertisers, if not all advertisers, to clearly and conspicuously
identify themselves by their correct legal name and place of business.
This is consistent with common sense and traditional business
practices, and we should not let a desire to promote e-commerce
undermine the basic concept that transactors should be required to
correctly and fully identify themselves.
C. The Benefits and Detriments of Anonymity to Consumers
The strongest arguments in favor of anonymity on the Internet
arise when anonymity is promoted as a tool for preserving the privacy
of online consumers.77 But we need to weigh the benefits and
detriments of consumer anonymity and determine if there are other,
better solutions for securing online privacy for consumers. In this
regard, although concerns about online privacy are usually attributed
to improved means of collecting and disseminating information, they
can also be attributed to improved online search capabilities" and our
wrap" license unenforceable for failure of mutual assent).
76. For instance, if I want to review various government filings for a business located
in Sacramento, California, I would have to search the records of the City of Sacramento
for a business license, the records of the County of Sacramento for fictitious business
name filings, and the records of the California Secretary of State for any corporate or
limited liability company filings. See, e.g., the records of the California Secretary of State
available at http://www.ss. ca.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2002); the records of the California
Franchise Tax Board, available at http://www.ftb.ca.gov (last visited Oct. 25, 2002); and the
records of the Sacramento County Recorder, available at
http://www.co.sacramento.ca.us/ccr/offrecs.html. Online services that make disparate
government filings available do exist, but they usually require a fee and, therefore, are not
likely to be used by the average consumer.
77. See supra notes 58, 65, 68-72.
78. In addition to the privacy concerns that arise due to the collection, use and sale of
information by Internet vendors, including the use of "cookies" and other devices that
enable individual buying and Internet searching habits to be tracked, we should also be
concerned about how search engines are designed and what type of information about us
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shifting notions of what constitutes "privacy." In the past, where
discussions of privacy tended to focus on "the right to be let alone,"
increasingly it appears to focus on a right to have disclosed
information restricted from further dissemination without notice to
and consent by the providing party. 9 In other words, the focus of the
privacy debate has shifted from society's acknowledged interest in
preserving the sanctity of one's home to an interest in protecting
specific information that, in many cases, is voluntarily disclosed to
others. Viewed from this perspective, it appears that the problem is
not a lack of anonymity but the absence of laws restricting the
collection, dissemination and use of sensitive (albeit not secret)
information.
Currently, if a consumer desires to be left alone, he has the
power to effectuate that purpose by withdrawing from the world. He
can limit the disclosure of his personal information. He can decline to
have a telephone, a credit card and an e-mail account. Like the
reclusive character in the recent movie, Finding Forrester, he can hire
someone to do his shopping for him. If he steps out into the world,
however, and chooses to take advantage of the conveniences and
benefits that society offers, he necessarily must reveal some
information about himself. When he shops in a store he can be seen
and his selection of goods witnessed. Thus, when he reaches outside
his home, either physically or electronically, his expectation of
privacy is diminishedY As long as consumers can withdraw from the
world and we otherwise take steps to prevent the collection and
is put on the Internet. Currently, much of what has been written by or about individuals, if
posted on the Internet, can be found using a number of widely available search engines. A
new verb has even developed concerning this phenomenon based upon the popular search
engine "Google." To be "googled" means that someone, your enemy or your friend, has
typed your name into Google to see what pops up. A lot of information about individuals
can be derived this way. Most of it is probably harmless or even positive, and if you have a
common name it will be difficult to figure out what item attaches to you, but the
technology suggests that we should not rush to put every bit of information about people
on the Internet. Even if information is open to the public - court records and arrest
records come to mind - given the potential lack of reliability and embarrassment of such
information, there is some benefit to be gained from not making the search of public
records too easy. It also leads me to suggest a new saying: "You can't judge a person by
his Google search."
79. See Posner, supra note 62 (stressing the difference between privacy in the sense of
"seclusion" and privacy in the sense of "secrecy").
80. In an infamous quip, Scott McNealy, chairman and CEO of Sun Microsystems,
observed: "You have zero privacy - get over it." Polly Sprenger, Sun on Privacy: "Get
Over It," at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/0,1283,17538,00.html (last visited Mar. 10,
2002).
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widespread dissemination of sensitive information such as health care
information and social security numbers, do we really want people to
be anonymous?
Obviously, what we see others do and purchase may color our
opinions of them, but the development of such opinions can be very
important. It is a truism that everyone has faults that he or she would
prefer to conceal, but at the same time, there are many reasons why it
is important to disclose certain information. For instance, if you are a
non-smoker you have an interest in knowing whether the person you
are dating smokes and, if so, how many packs of cigarettes he or she
purchases a week. You also have an interest in knowing whether he
or she has been married before, has children to support, has a history
of spousal or child abuse, or has a drinking problem. The foregoing is
just a small sampling of the type of information about others that we
collect on a daily basis and which allows us to order our social
interactions. Arguably, the more anonymity we accept in our daily
lives, the harder it will be for us to accurately judge the reliability,
truth and veracity of those with whom we deal, the more we will
become isolated from the real world, and the less we will be required
to take responsibility for our actions and decisions. In short, too
much anonymity is not a good thing if it prevents individuals and
companies from being a part of the day-to-day socialization process.
When I know the identity and reputation of the individual or
company with whom I am dealing, I am willing to provide basic
information about myself in exchange for the convenience of
purchasing goods online or from a catalogue. I do not want private
information about myself to be used for purposes other than my own
transactions, and I object to my private information being shared with
undisclosed third parties. However, I do not think I am entitled to
any greater privacy online than is available to me in the brick-and-
mortar world. Even if online consumers are entitled to greater
privacy than their counterparts in the physical world, a law that
restricts anonymous Internet advertising will not adversely impact the
privacy interests of consumers if they are still allowed to use
anonymity as a means of hiding their purchases.
Based upon the foregoing it is clear that there are both benefits
and detriments to anonymity on the Internet depending on the
context and circumstances of its use. How we balance the benefits
and detriments of anonymity depends, in large part, on how we
balance our interest in privacy against our interest in full disclosure.
However, as discussed in the next section of this article, it also
depends on the extent to which we value anonymity as a free speech
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right and whether the constitutional right of anonymity tips the
balance in favor of anonymity and away from full disclosure." I
submit that the constitutional right of anonymity is limited and does
not require a different constitutional analysis than the Supreme
Court's existing free speech jurisprudence provides.
IV. Analyzing the Regulation of Anonymous E-Commerce
Based on Existing Free Speech Jurisprudence
Although some may argue that anonymous speech should be
protected as an independent constitutional right, the decisions in
Talley and McIntyre establish that the right of anonymity should be
applied in accordance with the context in which it is used, i.e.,
political, religious, or literary.82 Anonymity is not an independent
category of speech subject to a specific level of scrutiny, but it is to be
judged in accordance with the category of speech to which it attaches.
Under current First Amendment jurisprudence, not all categories of
speech are treated equally.83 The first step in the analysis is to look at
the nature of the speech involved and then determine what level of
scrutiny to apply to the challenged regulation. On one extreme is the
"core political" speech involved in McIntyre, the regulation of which
is subject to exacting scrutiny. On the other extreme are certain
categories of speech, such as obscenity and "fighting words," that are
so devoid of any exposition of ideas that they lack all constitutional
protection. Somewhere in between these two extremes is
"commercial speech."
A. The Commercial Speech Doctrine
Unlike the speech involved in McIntyre, the speech that is
81. For those who tend toward the absolutists' view of free speech, it is unsettling to
believe that any sort of balancing occurs but it is difficult to explain the Supreme Court's
free speech jurisprudence any other way. The categorical approach that is applied does
reflect judgments about what types of speech are more susceptible to regulation. Some
may view this as a failure to give sufficient credence to freedom of speech, but it reflects
the fact that, often times, free speech is not the only important interest at stake. See
ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES, § 11.1.2
(Aspen Law & Business 1997) ("Line drawing is inevitable as to what speech will be
protected under the First Amendment and what can be proscribed or limited.").
82. See also Watchtower Bible, where the Court noted that one of the themes that
emerges from a number of cases involving door-to-door canvassing and pamphleteering is
"the value of the speech involved." Watchtower Bible, 122 S. Ct. at 2087 (2002).
83. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at § 11.3 ("The categories of unprotected and less
protected speech reflect value judgments by the Supreme Court that the justifications for
regulating such speech outweigh the value of the expression.").
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impacted by a law that requires identifying disclosures in Internet
advertisements is not "core political speech." Also, unlike the speech
involved in Watchtower, Internet advertising is not "an age-old form
of missionary evangelism." If anything, Internet advertising is
commercial speech that is subject to a lower level of scrutiny than was
applied in McIntyre.' "The Supreme Court has cited three factors to
consider in deciding whether speech is commercial: (1) is the speech
an advertisement; (2) does the speech refer to a specific product or
service; and (3) does the speaker have an economic motivation for the
speech."85 In this case, the context of the required disclosure (i.e., an
advertisement whereby an online advertiser proposes to engage in a
commercial transaction) is what determines the characterization of
the speech as commercial speech.86
Under current Supreme Court precedent, commercial speech is
analyzed under the four-part test set forth in Central Hudson Gas &
Electric Corporation v. Public Service Commission of New York:
At the outset, we must determine whether the First
84. Commercial speech has been variously defined as "speech which does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction,"' Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer
Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762 (1976) (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Human Relations
Comm'n, 413 U.S. 376, 385 (1973)); as "expression related solely to the economic interests
of the speaker and its audience," Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); and includes "advertising pure and simple." Zauderer
v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Superior Ct. of Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 637 (1985). See
also RONALD D. ROTUNDA ET AL., TREATISE ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, SUBSTANCE
AND PROCEDURE, § 20.26, (3d ed. 1986) (noting that although inconsistently-defined,
"commercial speech, for purposes of our discussion, may be understood as speech in any
form that advertises a product or service for profit or business purposes").
In order to be analyzed under the Supreme Court's commercial speech jurisprudence,
discussed in Section V of this article, a law that regulates Internet advertising must be
carefully worded so it does not encompass more than commercial speech. This is because
commercial speech that is intertwined with other forms of speech will be judged in
accordance with "the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the
compelled statement thereon." Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
See also Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 636 (1995) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)
("It would oversimplify to say that what we consider here is commercial speech and
nothing more, for in many instances the banned communications may be vital to the
recipients' right to petition the courts for redress of grievances.").
85. U.S. Healthcare v. Blue Cross of Greater Phila, 898 F.2d 914, 933 (3d Cir. 1990)
(citing Bolger v. Young's Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66-67 (1983)).
86. "Our lodestars in deciding what level of scrutiny to apply to a compelled
statement must be the nature of the speech taken as a whole and the effect of the
compelled statement thereon." Riley, 487 U.S. at 796. See also CHEMERINSKY, supra
note 81, at 801 § 11.3 (noting that the categories of speech subject to a lower level of
scrutiny - including commercial speech - "are defined based on the subject matter of the
speech and thus represent an exception to the usual rule that content-based regulation
must meet strict scrutiny").
[Vol. 29:3
Amendment protects the expression. For commercial speech to
come within that provision, it at least must concern lawful
activity and not be misleading. Next, we ask whether the
asserted governmental interest is substantial. If both inquiries
yield positive answers, we must determine whether the
regulation directly advances the governmental interest asserted,
and whether it is not more extensive than is necessary to serve
that interest.87
As noted in the recent case of Lorillard Tobacco Company v.
Reilly, the last part of the Central Hudson test does not require
application of "the least restrictive means" test, but only requires "a
'reasonable' fit between the legislature's ends and the means chosen
to accomplish those ends,... a means narrowly tailored to achieve
the desired objective."'  This test is in contrast to the "strict scrutiny"
test applied in McIntyre pursuant to which the State of Ohio was
required to show that the challenged law was "narrowly tailored to
serve an overriding state interest.,
89
With respect to a law that requires Internet advertisers to
disclose their identities and place of business, the first question to ask
is whether the law regulates speech at all.9° In contrast to a law that
proscribes what can be said, a law that bans anonymous e-commerce
would prescribe what must be said. On this point, the court in
87. 447 U.S. at 566. The four-part test of Central Hudson has been repeatedly
questioned by the court beginning with Justice Stevens' concurrence in Central Hudson
itself. Id. at 579-82. In 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. R.I. (1996), a majority of the court
expressed concern about how the test is to be applied in certain cases. 44 Liquormart,
Inc., 517 U.S. 484. Justice Thomas would not apply the test at all in cases "in which the
government's asserted interest is to keep legal users of a product or service ignorant in
order to manipulate their choices in the market place." Id. at 518. As explained by Justice
Kennedy in his concurring opinion in the recent case of Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, he
is concerned that the Central Hudson test "gives insufficient protection to truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech." Lorillard Tobacco Co., 533 U.S. 525, 571-72 (2001).
See also Justice Thomas' dissent in Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Eliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,
504 (1996) (" . . . I continue to disagree with the use of the Central Hudson balancing test
and the discounted weight given to commercial speech generally.").
Note that in Fla. Bar v. Went For It, Inc., the Central Hudson test is described as "a test
consisting of three related prongs" made up of the last three of the parts of the Central
Hudson test. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. 618, 623-24 (1995). Of course, whether the speech
is non-misleading commercial speech (the first prong of the Central Hudson test) is the
threshold question.
88. Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 556.
89. 514 U.S. at 347.
90. See Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliot, Inc., 521 U.S. 457, 469-471, 474 (1997)
(where a majority of the Supreme Court held that a regulation that requires fruit farmers
to contribute to an advertising fund does not compel speech, and therefore, the Central
Hudson test does not apply to determine the constitutionality of the regulation).
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McIntyre noted "an author's decision to remain anonymous, like
other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
First Amendment."9  Or, as stated in an earlier case, "[s]ince all
speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave
unsaid, one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is
that one who chooses to speak may also decide 'what not to say.""
Arguably then, the decision of a seller of goods and services to be
anonymous is a form of protected speech, albeit commercial speech.93
The second prong of Central Hudson instructs us to consider
whether the regulation concerns lawful activity that is not misleading.
Though misleading speech is not the only type of speech that can be
regulated, the regulation of illegal activity and misleading advertising
is permissible "without further justification."94 Or, as stated in In re
R.M.J.:
Truthful advertising related to lawful activities is entitled to the
protections of the First Amendment. But when the particular
content or method of advertising suggest that it is inherently
misleading or when experience has proved that in fact such
advertising is subject to abuse, the States may impose
appropriate restrictions. Misleading advertising may be
prohibited entirely. But the States may not place an absolute
prohibition on certain types of potentially misleading
information ... if the information also may be presented in a
way that is not deceptive.9
As Justice Stevens discussed in his plurality opinion in Peel v.
Attorney Registration and Disciplinary Commission of Illinois,
commercial speech may be: (1) truthful, (2) false, (3) misleading, or
91. 514 U.S. at 342.
92. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (holding
that a governmental entity cannot dictate the speech content of a private forum). See also
Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995)
(holding that a municipality could not require a parade to include a particular message).
93. Query whether all decisions not to speak are properly considered a form of
expression protected by the First Amendment or only those decisions not to speak that are
coupled with actual speech? In other words, is there a First Amendment right to stay
silent in all circumstances? See dissenting opinion of Justices Rehnquist, Stevens and
White in Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 32 (noting that the right not to speak is a
"component of the broader constitutional interest of natural persons in freedom of
conscience" and it should not apply to corporations).
94. Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 768 (1993) ("[O]ur cases make clear that the
State may ban commercial expression that is fraudulent or deceptive without further
justification ....")
95. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982). See also Peel v. Attorney Registration &
Disciplinary Comm'n of II1., 496 U.S. 91, 100 (1990) (plurality opinion by Stevens, J.).
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(4) potentially misleading.' False and misleading commercial speech
may be regulated without having to meet the Central Hudson test, but
the government bears the burden of establishing that the speech is
false or misleading:
The State's burden is not slight; the "free flow of commercial
information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be
regulators the costs of distinguishing the truthful from the false,
the helpful from the misleading, and the harmless from the
harmful.""'
If a statute proscribes legal activity, accurate speech, or speech
that is only potentially misleading, it is subject to the higher standard
of Central Hudson; namely, "the State must assert a substantial
interest and the interference with speech must be in proportion to the
interest served." 98
The "activity" at issue in anonymous Internet advertising is not
affirmative speech but rather the non-expression of information
about sellers in Internet advertisements. There is nothing inherently
illegal about a seller failing to disclose factual information about
itself. Thus, it would appear that the regulation of Internet
advertising in the manner suggested concerns lawful activity.
Whether such lawful activity is "false" or "misleading" is another
question. Clearly, if the seller of goods or services wrongly identifies
itself in advertisements (e.g., says it is General Motors Company
when it is Ford Motor Company), it is engaging in fraudulent activity
that can be prohibited as long as the prohibition is rationally related
to the fraud the state seeks to prevent.99 But is anonymous Internet
advertising "inherently misleading" such that it can be regulated
96. 496 U.S. at 100-10.
97. Ibanez v. Fla. Dep't of Bus. & Prof'I Regulation, Bd. of Accountancy, 512 U.S.
136, 143 (1994) (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of
Ohio, 471 U.S. 626, 646).
98. Id. (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203. But see Zauderer discussed, infra, in
which the Supreme Court applied a less exacting standard to a mandated disclosure
requirement in the commercial context).
99. The "rational basis test" is the minimal level of review that is applied to laws
challenged under the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
See, CHEMERINSKY, supra, note 81, at 415 § 6.5 (citing Penell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S.
1 (1988)); U.S. R. R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166 (1980); Allied Stores v. Bowers, 358
U.S. 522 (1959); Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483 (1955); and Day-Brite Lighting,
Inc. v. Mo., 342 U.S. 421 (1952). See also Ibanez, 512 U.S. at 142; NOWAK & ROTUNDA,
supra note 84, at 457 (if the government attempts to deter or punish false or misleading
advertising, it will not be subjected to overbreadth analysis and therefore will not be
required to demonstrate that its law is no more extensive than necessary to achieve that
goal).
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without invoking the level of scrutiny required by Central Hudson?
Although the Supreme Court's commercial speech cases have
frequently noted the difference in treatment to be accorded false and
misleading speech, those cases do not clearly define what is meant by
the term "inherently misleading." Seeds of a definition can be found
in a number of Supreme Court cases and in FTC pronouncements on
the subject.'" Initially, it is to be noted that the plurality opinion in
Peel stated that "[w]hether the inherent character of a statement
places it beyond the protection of the First Amendment is a question
of law over which Members of this Court should exercise de novo
review.,, .1°
As stated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Ass'n of
National Advertisers, Inc. v. Lungren, the following four factors
govern whether commercial speech enjoys the protection of the First
Amendment:
(i) whether the speech restricted is devoid of "intrinsic
meaning", Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1, 12... (1978); (ii) the
"possibility for deception", id. at 13; (iii) whether "experience
has proved that in fact such advertising is subject to abuse," In
re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 ... (1982); (iv) the "ability of the
intended audience to evaluate the claims made."'0 2
Courts will also consider whether the speech is "more likely to
deceive the public than to inform it,"' 3 and whether it is "incapable of
being presented in a way that is not deceptive."" 4 According to the
FTC, "[a] misleading omission occurs when qualifying information
necessary to prevent a practice, claim, representation, or reasonable
expectation or belief from being misleading is not disclosed."' 5 The
fact that certain speech may be potentially misleading to some
consumers is not enough to establish that it is inherently misleading."
Applying the foregoing analysis, it is clear that anonymous
100. As noted by the Supreme Court in FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., although
decisions of the F'C on the issue of deceptive practices are not binding upon the courts,
"[the] statutory scheme necessarily gives the commission an influential role in interpreting
[the law of false advertising] and in applying it to the facts of particular cases arising out of
unprecedented situations." Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374, 385 (1965)
101. 496 U.S. at 108.
102. 44 F.3d 726 (9th Cir. 1994).
103. W. States Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 69 F. Supp. 2d.1288, 1298 (D. Nv. 1999).
104. Revo v. Disciplinary Bd. of the Supreme Court, 106 F.3d 929, 933 (10th Cir. 1997)
(citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191,203 (1982)).
105. FTC Policy Statement on Deceptive Acts and Practices, reprinted in 4 Trade
Regulation Reporter (CCH) 20,911 and 13,205 (Oct. 14,1983).
106. Id. at 109 (citing In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. at 203).
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Internet advertising is potentially misleading. Indeed, concerns about
the misleading nature of anonymous Internet advertising should be at
the heart of any effort to prohibit such speech. Depending largely on
our experiences with Internet advertising, which at this point is a little
more than eight years,1"7 and the particulars of what the advertisement
says, what it does not say and what it suggests, it may also be argued
that anonymous Internet advertising is inherently misleading. Unless
the source of anonymous Internet advertising is easy to trace (e.g., by
being able to find identifying information on other pages of a web
site), arguably the omission of identifying information on web sites
and in e-mail solicitations is misleading because consumers do not
have sufficient information to evaluate the claims made.
As in meat space, many online advertisers are reputable
businesses that do their best to avoid engaging in false or misleading
advertising. But the prevalence of misleading e-mail communications
and Internet advertisements cannot be ignored. Indeed, it appears
that efforts to trick people into opening e-mail advertisements have
become a preferred method of doing business. One trick that is
utilized by bulk e-mailers or "spammers" " is to send an e-mail with a
"from" line that includes either the recipient's name or a common
name that can easily be mistaken for a friend, associate or family
member. Internet advertisers have also been known to divert (some
would say "hijack") Internet users from popular websites in a way
that forces them to view unwanted advertisements. °a These tricks
may make certain forms of Internet advertising "inherently
misleading" and, thus, more easily regulated.
But even if anonymous Internet advertising is not inherently
misleading and the last two steps of the Central Hudson analysis must
be applied to the challenged law, the law should not be declared
unconstitutional to the extent the asserted governmental interests are
substantial and the law directly advances those interests. Discussing
the level of justification needed under Central Hudson, the Supreme
107. As noted in Just A Click Away,"[o]nline advertising was born on October 27, 1994
when Hotwired (http://www.hotwired.com), the online version of Wired magazine signed
up 14 advertisers for its online debut." KAYE & MEDOFF, supra note 9, at 6.
108. The term "spammers" refers to individuals and companies who send "spam."
"Spam" is defined as "electronic junk mail: an unsolicited often commercial message
transmitted through the Internet as a mass mailing to a large number of recipients."
ENCARTA DICrIONARY, supra note 16,
http://dictionary.msn.com/find/entry.asp?search=spam.
109. See FFC Consumer Alert, Trapped in the Tangled Web: Web Scheme Diverts
Consumers from Their Intended Sites (FTC October 2001).
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Court in Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox,
explained:
In sum, while we have insisted that the free flow of commercial
information is valuable enough to justify imposing on would-be
regulators the costs of distinguishing.., the harmless from the
harmful, we have not gone so far as to impose upon them the
burden of demonstrating that the distinguishment is 100%
complete, or that the manner of restriction is absolutely the
least severe that will achieve the desired end.110
It is also not necessary for the relationship between the harm and
the governmental interest to be shown by empirical data that is
"accompanied by a surfeit of background information.'.'" Rather, the
Supreme Court has "permitted litigants to justify speech restrictions
by reference to studies and anecdotes pertaining to different locales
altogether, or even, in a case applying strict scrutiny, to justify
restrictions based solely on history, consensus, and "simple common
sense.,,112
Based upon simple common sense, there are several reasons why
states may require Internet advertisers to disclose their identities.
First is their "general interest in protecting consumers and regulating
commercial transactions." '',3 Second is their interest in eliminating
fraudulent transactions.""4 Third is to give buyers the information
they need to pursue any remedies they may have under warranties or
for product defects. Like the statute in Buckley v. Valeo, discussed
infra, the law may also be an essential means of gathering data
necessary to deter fraud. Altogether, the statute would be designed
to ensure that consumers have accurate information upon which to
make purchasing decisions. As noted in Edenfield v. Fane, a state's
interest in ensuring the accuracy of commercial information in the
marketplace is substantial."5
110. 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citations and internal quotations omitted) (upholding a
regulation that banned commercial activities in college dorms).
111. Went For It, Inc., 515 U.S. at 628 (1995).
112. Id. (citing Renton Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986)); Barnes v.
Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560, 584-585 (1991) (Souter, J., concurring); and Burson v.
Freeman, 504 U.S. 191, 211 (1992). See also Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525,
533 (2001).
113. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 460 (1978).
114. As noted by Justice O'Connor in Buckley v. Am. Const. Law Found., Inc., a
state's interests in combating fraud is substantial. 525 U.S. 182, 222 (1999) (O'Connor, J.
and Breyer, J. concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 67- 68 (1976)).
115. 507 U.S. at 769.
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As for the last part of the Central Hudson test, the actual
language of the challenged law will be critical for evaluating the
sufficiency of the nexus between the asserted governmental interests
and the law's requirements. In general, however, the required
disclosure of information in commercial advertising has long been
seen as a permissible, unobtrusive and, in fact, preferred means of
preventing fraud."6 When given a choice between restricting a certain
type of speech and requiring disclosures in order to ameliorate the
asserted harms of that speech, the Supreme Court not only often
allows, but also frequently recommends, the disclosure route. Indeed,
"[t]he prime justification for a system of free speech has long been
held to be its value in preventing human error through ignorance......
Commenting upon the importance of commercial speech in the
"marketplace of ideas," the Court in Bates v. State Bar of Arizona
observed:
Commercial speech serves to inform the public of the
availability, nature, and prices of products and services, and
thus performs an indispensable role in the allocation of
resources in a free enterprise system .... In short, such speech
serves individual and societal interests in assuring informed and
reliable decisionmaking."'
A law that is carefully drafted to give consumers basic identifying
information without impeding other, more important, editorial
choices should meet the foregoing tests.
B. Mandated Disclosure Cases
In addition to the commercial speech cases discussed above, the
Supreme Court has examined the constitutionality of several statutes
that mandate the disclosure of information. Applying varying levels
of scrutiny based on the context of the disclosures, many statutes
were upheld against constitutional challenges. A consistent theme of
these cases is that providing individuals with more information is a
116. See 44 Liqourmart Inc., 517 U.S. at 498 (1996)("[W]e explained that the State may
require commercial messages to 'appear in such a form, or include such additional
information, warnings, and disclaimers, as are necessary to prevent its being deceptive."')
(quoting Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 772, n. 24). See also Zauderer, 471 U.S. at
651-52.
117. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 84, at 1060 (quoting Justice Holmes' famous
dissent in Abrams v. U.S., 250 U.S. 616, 630 ("[T]he best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market.")). In Va. St. Bd. of
Pharmacy, the Court noted that giving individuals information upon which to make
informed decisions is at the very heart of the free speech guarantee. 425 U.S. at 770.
118. 433 U.S. 350, 364 (1977) (internal citation omitted).
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desirable outcome of legislation, particularly where disclosure
requirements are chosen over direct restrictions on speech."9 Thus,
even in a case like Buckley v. Valeo2° where strict scrutiny was
applied to test the constitutionality of the Federal Election Campaign
Act of 1971, mandated disclosure requirements will be upheld where
"there are governmental interests sufficiently important to outweigh
the possibility of infringement [of the exercise of First Amendment
rights] ... .,,12. Of potential significance to a law banning anonymous
Internet advertising, the governmental interests found sufficient in
Buckley v. Valeo were: (1) the interest in providing the electorate
with information; (2) the interest in deterring actual corruption; and
(3) the interest in providing the means of gathering data necessary to
detect violations of the provisions of the law.22
In mandated disclosure cases, the key to the free speech analysis
is not that an individual is being forced to speak, but the context and
nature of what he is required to say. In areas where some regulation
is deemed proper, requiring basic identifying information will
generally be found constitutional. For instance, in United States v.
Harris, the Supreme Court examined the mandated disclosure
provisions of the Federal Regulation of Lobbying Act."2 Finding that
the law did not violate the freedoms guaranteed by the First
119. In upholding the disclosure requirements, the court in Buckley quoted the advice
of Justice Brandeis: "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social and industrial
diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric light the most efficient
policeman." 424 U.S. 1, 67 (1976) (citing L. BRANDEIS, OTHER PEOPLE'S MONEY, 62
(National Home Library Foundation ed. 1933) (1914)).
120. Id. at 60-84 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 431 et seq. (1970 ed., Supp. IV)).
121. Id. at 66 (citing Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1,
97 (1961)).
122. Id. at 66-67. In contrast, the government's interests in McIntyre were found
insufficient. Comparing the disclosure requirements in Buckley with those imposed on
Mrs. McIntyre, the court in McIntyre noted:
Though such mandatory reporting undeniably impedes protected First
Amendment activity, the intrusion is a far cry from compelled self-identification
on all election-related writings. A written election-related document -
particularly a leaflet - is often a personally crafted statement of a political
viewpoint . . . As such, identification of the author against her will is
particularly intrusive; it reveals unmistakably the content of her thoughts on a
controversial issue. Disclosure of a expenditure and its use, without more,
reveals far less information ... even though money may "talk," its speech is less
specific, less personal, and less provocative than a handbill - and as a result,
when money supports an unpopular viewpoint it is less likely to precipitate
retaliation.
514 U.S. 334, 355 (1995). Based upon the foregoing reasoning, it can be argued that
Internet advertising reveals even less personal information than campaign spending.
123. 347 U.S. 612 (1954).
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Amendment, and consistent with the theme noted above, the Court
observed that Congress "has merely provided for a modicum of
information from those who for hire attempt to influence legislation
or who collect or spend funds for that purpose."24 Similarly, Meese v.
Keene concerned the constitutionality of the Foreign Agents
Registration Act of 1938 ("FARA") requiring persons engaging in
"political propaganda" on behalf of foreign powers to "file detailed
registration statements," including their name and address."' After
first noting that FARA only "required the disseminators of such
material to make additional disclosures that would better enable the
public to evaluate the import of propaganda," the Court upheld the
statute, stating: "By compelling some disclosure of information and
permitting more, the FARA's approach recognizes that the best
remedy for misleading or inaccurate speech contained within
materials subject to the Act is fair, truthful, and accurate speech." '26
Another mandated disclosure case, Buckley v. American
Constitutional Law Foundation, Inc., principally involved a challenge
to a provision of law that required petition circulators to wear
identification badges. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's
decision to invalidate the badge requirement. However, the Court
also affirmed the holding that a requirement that petition circulators
submit an affidavit containing their name and address was not an
impermissible regulation of speech.'27  For First Amendment
purposes, the critical distinction between the two provisions was the
timing and context of the mandated disclosures. The Court held that
in the context of political speech, mandated disclosures at the point of
direct face-to-face confrontation was too much.2  Significantly, the
Court's main concern was not the destruction of anonymity itself, but
the adverse impact that the timing of the disclosures might have on
the willingness of individuals to participate in petition gathering
activities. Unlike the petition gathering process, an identification
requirement in the context of commercial speech is unlikely to
dissuade lawful and truthful commercial speech.
124. Id. at 625.
125. 481 U.S. 465, 469, 471 (1987).
126. Id. at 480-81 (citing Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring)).
127. 525 U.S. 182, 189 (1999); but see Watchtower Bible, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002) (the
Supreme Court invalidated a permit requirement but without explicitly overruling its
earlier holding in Buckley).
128. See also Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988) (discussing the face-to-face
nature of the petition gathering process).
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The Supreme Court first considered a mandated disclosure
requirement in the context of commercial speech in Zauderer v.
Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio.'29 In
addressing the portion of a disciplinary decision that faulted an
attorney for failing to explain in an advertisement that his clients
might be liable for significant litigation costs, the Court noted that
there are "material differences between disclosure requirements and
outright prohibitions on speech."'30 The Court also emphasized the
reasoning behind the lower standard of scrutiny applicable to
commercial speech.
Because the extension of First Amendment protection to
commercial speech is justified principally by the value to
consumers of the information such speech provides, ....
appellant's constitutionally protected interest in not providing
any particular factual information in his advertising is minimal.
Thus, in virtually all our commercial speech decisions to date,
we have emphasized that because disclosure requirements
trench much more narrowly on an advertiser's interests than do
flat prohibitions on speech, "warning[s] or disclaimer[s] might
be appropriately required ... in order to dissipate the
possibility of consumer confusion or deception."''
Of course, the foregoing statement does not mean that all forms
of mandated disclosures are permissible.
In Glickman v. Wileman Brothers. & Elliott, Inc., the Supreme
Court listed the types of laws that previously have been found to
violate the First Amendment: (1) laws that require one to repeat an
objectionable message out of his own mouth; (2) laws that require
one to use his own property to convey an antagonistic ideological
message; (3) laws that compel association among differing groups;
and (4) laws that require one to endorse or to finance any political or
ideological views.3 2 Unlike the interests that were at stake in the
cases of Wooley v. Maynard,'33 Miami Herald Publishing Co. v.
129. 471 U.S. 626 (1985).
130. Id. at 650.
131. Id. at 651 (quoting In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 201 (1982) (internal citation
omitted)).
132. Glickman v. Wileman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., 521 U.S. 457,469-472 (1997) (citing W.
Va. Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632 (1943)); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm'n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 18 (1986);
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 88 (1980); Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian &
Bisexual Group of Boston, Inc., 515 U.S. 557 (1995); Machinists v. State, 367 U.S. 740
(1961); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Ed., 431 U.S. 209 (1977); and Keller v. State Bar of Cal.,
496 U.S. 1 (1990). See also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988).
133. 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (involving a statute that required noncommercial motor
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Tornillo"' and West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette,'35
however, the Zauderer court noted that Ohio did not attempt to
"prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or
other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act
their faith therein." '136 Nor was it a case where a private corporation
was compelled to provide a forum for views other than its own.137
Rather, Ohio attempted only "to prescribe what shall be orthodox in
commercial advertising.,
138
The Court in Zauderer went on to explain that it does not mean
to suggest that disclosure requirements do not implicate the
advertiser's First Amendment rights at all, but rather that the
standard of review for such regulations is less than required by
Central Hudson.39 It specifically rejected the appellant's contention
that disclosure requirements should be subjected to a strict "least
restrictive means" test, noting: "[a]lthough we have subjected outright
prohibitions of speech to such an analysis, all our discussions of
restraints on commercial speech have recommended disclosure
requirements as one of the acceptable less restrictive alternatives to
actual suppression of speech."'1' Thus, in the context of commercial
speech, the Supreme Court only requires that mandated disclosure
requirements be "reasonably related to the State's interest in
preventing deception to consumers" and not "unjustified or unduly
burdensome."'' 41 Under this test, a statute that requires an Internet
advertiser to identify himself by his correct legal name and address
should survive a constitutional challenge because it is reasonably
related to the asserted governmental interests of preventing fraud and
improving the information that is available to consumers.
vehicles to bear license plates with the state motto "Live Free or Die").
134. 418 U.S. 241 (1974) (involving a statute that required newspapers to grant
political candidates equal space to reply to criticisms and attacks).
135. 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (involving a statute that compelled public school children to
salute the flag of the United States).
136. 471 U.S. at 651.
137. See Pac. Gas & Elec., 475 U.S. at 9-12 (discussing Tornillo and PruneYard).
138. 471 U.S. at 651.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 651-52, n.14 (citing Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 565). In a later case, Justice
Souter characterized Zauderer as a case that "reaffirmed a long-standing preference for
disclosure requirements over outright bans, as more narrowly tailored cures for the
potential of commercial messages to mislead by saying too little." 521 U.S. at 490-91
(Souter, J. dissenting). See also Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 n.9
("Purely commercial speech is more susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements.").
141. Zauderer, 471 U.S. at 651-52.
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C. Direct Solicitation Cases
Depending upon the nature and invasiveness of Internet
advertising, the Supreme Court's decisions in cases involving the
regulation of direct solicitations may provide further arguments to
support a ban on anonymous Internet advertisements. While many
laws regulating direct in-person and mail solicitations have been
struck down on First Amendment grounds,142 others have been
upheld. Frequently in these cases, the Court has noted that some
advertising and promotional activities are more prone to abuse than
others and, therefore, more easily regulated. For instance, in Breard
v. Alexandria, a case that was decided before the development of the
Supreme Court's current commercial speech jurisprudence, the court
upheld the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that restricted
door-to-door solicitations."3 In so doing, the Court emphasized the
invasiveness of door-to-door solicitations and the legitimate interest
that society has in protecting the sanctity of one's home.1"
Even in cases where limitations on various modes of direct
solicitation have been struck down, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted that laws that are addressed at eliminating abusive
and intrusive advertising practices may pass constitutional muster. In
Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, the Court said:
Our decision in Ohralik that a State could categorically ban all
in-person solicitation turned on two factors. First was our
characterization of face-to-face solicitation as a practice rife
with possibilities for overreaching, invasion of privacy, the
exercise of undue influence and outright fraud. . . . Second,
unique... difficulties,... would frustrate any attempt at state
regulation of in-person solicitation short of an absolute ban
because such solicitation is not visible or otherwise open to
142. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible, 122 S. Ct. 2080 (2002); Shapero v. Ky. Bar Ass'n, 486
U.S. 466 (1988) (involving a rule prohibiting targeted direct-mail solicitations by lawyers);
Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prod., 463 U.S. 60 (1983) (involving a statute that banned direct-
mail advertisements for contraceptives); Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761 (1993) (involving
a ban on in-person solicitation by certified public accountants); Murdock v. Pennsylvania,
319 U.S. 105 (1943) (involving an ordinance that restricted door-to-door solicitations);
Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (involving an ordinance that prohibited door-to-
door solicitation); and Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976) (involving an
ordinance regulating door-to-door solicitations).
143. 341 U.S. 622 (1951).
144. Id. at 644:
The issue brings into collision the rights of the hospitable housewife, peering on
Monday morning around her chained door, with those of Mr. Breard's courteous,
well-trained but. possibly persistent solicitor, offering a bargain on culture and
information through a joint subscription to the Saturday Evening Post, Pic and
Today's Woman.
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public scrutiny. 4'
Likewise, in Edenfield, the Court noted that "[e]ven solicitation
that is neither fraudulent nor deceptive may be pressed with such
frequency or vehemence as to intimidate, vex or harass the
recipient" ... and provide the "legitimate and important state
interest" needed to withstand scrutiny under the First Amendment.46
In an opinion by Justice Powell, the majority in Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Association observed that "[u]nlike a public advertisement,
which simply provides information and leaves the recipient free to act
upon it or not, in-person solicitation may exert pressure and often
demands an immediate response, without providing an opportunity
for comparison and reflection."1 '7 More generally, the Court noted
that "[t]he immediacy of a particular communication and the
imminence of harm are factors that have made certain
communications less protected than others"'4 s and that one of the
problems with in-person solicitations is that it "is not visible or
otherwise open to public scrutiny ... rendering it difficult or
impossible to obtain reliable proof of what actually took place."'' 9
Similar arguments can be applied to Internet advertisements. Many
Internet advertisements, particularly those that are in the form of
spam, are worded in ways that demand an immediate response and
although technically accessible by the public, are not readily visible to
the general public. Also, given the growing volume of spam and
other forms of invasive Internet advertising, it may be argued that
Internet advertising is "pressed with sufficient frequency and
vehemence" to justify the proposed limitation on anonymous Internet
advertising."
145. Ohralik, 436 U.S. 447, 475 (1978) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
146. 507 U.S. at 769.
147. 436 U.S. 447, 457 (1978).
148. Id., n.13 (citing Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971)); Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969); Schenck v.
United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919). See also Shapero, 486 U.S. at 475 ("In assessing the
potential for overreaching and undue influence, the mode of communication makes all the
difference."); FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 728, 748 (1978) ("We have long recognized
that each medium of expression presents special First Amendment problems.") (citing
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502- 03 (1952)).
149. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 466.
150. Eugene Volokh has observed:
As the economic constraints on sending tidal waves of unsolicited mail are
removed, legal restrictions may have to take their place. Today such restrictions
might be seen as unconstitutional, at least as to noncommercial speech. But if
indeed e-mailing is next to free, then the assumption that the 'short, though
Spring 2002] IN FOR A CALF
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
The beauty of the Internet, at least from the advertising
professional's point of view, is that Internet advertising campaigns
can be designed to precisely target the interests of potential
consumers.5 ' Of potential significance to e-mail advertisements, the
Court in Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc. noted a difference in
invasiveness between untargeted and targeted solicitations.5 2 In that
case, the Court considered a challenge to a rule of professional
conduct that precluded lawyers from mailing targeted solicitations to
accident or disaster victims within thirty-days after the accident or
disaster. Applying the Central Hudson test, the Court had "little
trouble crediting the Bar's interest as substantial" and upheld the
challenged rule because it "targets a concrete, non-speculative
harm.'53 In doing so, the Court emphasized the state's interest in
protecting the privacy of its citizens and its concern that targeted mail
is more prone to abuse.'54 Thus, it may be argued that targeted,
anonymous e-mail is prone to abuse.
Most recently in the Watchtower case, the Court noted that the
prevention of fraud, the prevention of crime and the protection of
residents' privacy are important governmental interests that may
support the regulation of door-to-door solicitations.' The problem
with the ordinance in that case was its overbreadth and the perceived
adverse impact that the ordinance would have on religious speech.
The Court, however, telegraphed its view that if the ordinance had
been limited in scope to commercial activities and the solicitation of
funds, it was more likely to have been upheld against constitutional
attack.'56 Indeed, in support of its opinion, the Court cited several
cases that contain language supportive of the regulation of
regular journey from mail box to trash can' is 'an acceptable burden, at least so
far as the Constitution is concerned' may stop being reasonable.
Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1845 (1995)
(quoting Bolger v. Young's Drug Prod. Corp., 463 U.S. 60 (1983)).
151. ZEFF& ARONSON, supra note 9, Chapter 6, at 133:
For a long time Internet advertisers dreamed of delivering the right ad to the
right person at the right time. In the early days of online advertising, the
realization of this dream was touted as the true promise and potential of the
industry. What was once just promise is now reality.
152. 515 U.S. 618, 630 (1995) ("[An untargeted letter mailed to society at large is
different in kind from a targeted solicitation ... .
153. Id. at 625, 628-29.
154. Id. at 625-30.
155. 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2089 (2002).
156. Id.
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commercial solicitation. '57
D. The Captive Audience Doctrine
Although the significance of the "captive audience doctrine" has
not been fully defined by the Supreme Court,5 ' the case law that
exists provides the seeds for further arguments in support of a law
banning anonymous Internet advertising. Under the captive audience
doctrine "in certain circumstances, the unwillingness of persons to
receive a message outweighs another's right to speak." '159 Anyone
who has had his work online interrupted by an advertisement that
pops-up on the screen for no apparent reason can attest to the fact
that, in some circumstances, the recipients of Internet advertising are
members of a captive audience. The question will be how invasive
the advertisements are and how easily they can be avoided."6
In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, one of the first cases to
apply the captive audience doctrine, the Supreme Court upheld a
municipal ordinance that banned political advertisements on city
buses due, in part, to the fact that bus riders could not easily avoid the
advertisements. 6' According to the plurality and concurring opinions,
where the recipient of an advertisement is a captive audience there is
more leeway to regulate the advertiser. More recently, the Supreme
Court applied the captive audience doctrine in the case of Frisby v.
Schultz when it considered the constitutionality of an ordinance
banning residential picketing.62 Emphasizing the state's strong
interest in protecting the privacy of one's home, the majority upheld
the challenged ordinance because "[tihere is simply no right to force
157. See, e.g., Hynes, 425 U.S. 610, 616-17 (1976) ("But in these very cases the court
has consistently recognized a municipality's power to protect its citizens from crime and
undue annoyance by regulating soliciting and canvassing.").
158. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 81, at § 11.3.4.6., n.256 at 845.
159. Marcy Strauss, Redefining the Captive Audience Doctrine, 19 HASTINGS CONST.
L.Q. 85 (1991) (noting that the captive audience doctrine is ill-defined and attempting to
define the appropriate parameters of the doctrine and what is meant by the term
"captive").
160. See Consol. Edison Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 541 (1980)
("[T]o shut off discourse solely to protect others form hearing it [is] dependent upon a
showing that substantial privacy interests are being invaded in an essentially intolerable
manner.") (quoting Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
161. 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (plurality opinion by Blackman, J. in which Chief Justice
White and Rehnquist, J. joined ) (Douglas, J. concurring in the judgment on the grounds
that a city could protect unwilling recipients of political advertisements).
162. 487 U.S. 474 (1988).
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speech into the home of an unwilling listener."'63 The Court further
noted that in ascertaining what limits may be placed on protected
speech it has "often focused on the 'place' of that speech, considering
the nature of the forum the speaker seeks to employ.""'
The Internet is a place where speech occurs and often such
speech occurs in the privacy of one's home. As with a television set, a
person's Internet connection can be turned off, but arguably the
Internet has more of the captive audience features of a bus. Like a
bus, when one is surfing the Internet, he is typically online for a
purpose other than viewing advertisements and, thus, may not be able
to avoid unwanted Internet advertisements without curtailing his
other activities. Since, under the captive audience doctrine, laws have
been upheld that completely ban certain forms of speech, a law that
only requires identifying disclosures should be upheld as a lesser
restriction on speech that is delivered in such manner.
Obviously, the complete history of Internet advertising has yet to
be written, but the notion that Internet advertising may be easier to
regulate than untargeted print and direct mail advertisements is not
implausible.' In fact, advertising professionals view Internet
advertising as a more direct and, therefore, a potentially more
successful form of advertising than print advertisements, direct mail
or television. This is due to what is known as "social presence" or
"telepresence" and the belief that Internet advertisements may be
closer on the social presence continuum to face-to-face
communication than other forms of electronic advertising.'66 In light
163. Id. at 485.
164. Id. at 479 ("Our cases have recognized that the standards by which limitations on
speech must be evaluated 'differ depending on the character of the property at issue."')
(quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 44 (1983)).
165. For the same argument with respect to unsolicited telephone calls, see Nadel,
supra note 65, at 103 ("Intrusive communication provides greater justification for
regulating the communicator than more passive communication. Since unsolicited phone
calls reach the individual in his or her home and are aural rather than visual, they are
especially appropriate candidates for regulation.").
166. See EVERETT M. ROGERS, COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGY, THE NEW IN
MEDIA SOCIETY, 52-54 (The Free Press 1986) ("Social presence is the degree to which a
communication medium is perceived to be socio-emotionally similar to face-to-face
conversation. This quality is called social presence because it indicates the degree to
which an individual feels that a communication partner is actually present during their
exchange of information."); see also James R. Coyle & Esther Thorson, The Effects of
Progressive Levels of Interactivity and Vividness in Web Marketing Sites, The Journal of
Advertising, American Academy of Advertising, (Fall 2001) Vol 30, No. 3, at 65
("Attitudes developed through direct experience are more confidently held, more
enduring, and more resistant to attack than are those developed through indirect
[Vol. 29:3
of such qualities, a law banning anonymous Internet advertising may
be upheld against constitutional attack on the further ground that it is
needed to curb abusive and invasive advertising techniques and,
thereby, secure a measure of privacy for a state's citizens."'
V. Analyzing Anonymity in E-Commerce Based on
McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commision
As noted above, the U.S. Supreme Court has previously
addressed the constitutional right of anonymity in four cases.1" It first
recognized such a right in Talley when it considered the
constitutionality of an ordinance restricting the distribution of any
handbill unless it included the name and address of the person who
printed, wrote, compiled, manufactured or distributed the same.69
The ordinance was found to be unconstitutional on its face because,
"[t]here can be no doubt that such an identification requirement
would tend to restrict freedom to distribute information and thereby
freedom of expression."'7 Writing for the majority, Justice Black
emphasized the important role that "anonymous pamphlets, leaflets,
brochures and even books have played.., in the progress of
mankind" and the concern that "identification and fear of reprisal
might deter perfectly peaceful discussions of public matters of
importance.'' 7 Noting that anonymity "has sometimes been assumed
for the most constructive purposes," the Court did not pause to
consider whether anonymity is desirable in all contexts.'72
In its most comprehensive examination of the constitutional right
of anonymity to date, the Supreme Court in McIntyre v. Ohio
Elections Commission considered the constitutionality of a statute
that prohibited the distribution of anonymous campaign literature.'73
experience .... [P]resence is the direct experience of reality, and telepresence is the
simulated perception of direct experience .... ).
167. If Congress or the states enact a law that enables individuals to exercise greater
control over the sanctity of their own home, the Supreme Court's decision in Rowan v.
U.S. Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728 (1970), stands for the proposition that it is likely to
withstand a First Amendment challenge.
168. See cases cited, supra notes 1 and 2.
169. Talley, 362 U.S. 60, 60-61 (1960).
170. Id. at 64 (quoting Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938)).
171. Id. at 64-65.
172. Id. at 63-64.
173. Specifically, the statute provides:
No person shall write, print, post, or distribute, ... a notice, placard, dodger,
advertisement, sample ballot, or any other form of general publication which is
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In that case, Margaret McIntyre had been fined $100 for distributing
handbills in opposition to a proposed school tax levy that did not
contain required identifying disclosures."' Justice Stevens, writing for
a majority of the Court, began by recognizing the importance of
anonymity in the literary realm and the reasons individuals may
choose to engage in anonymous speech."' Whatever the motivation,
he reasoned, "at least in the field of literary endeavor, the interest in
having anonymous works enter the marketplace of ideas
unquestionably outweighs any public interest in requiring disclosure
as a condition of entry." He then noted that "[t]he freedom to
publish anonymously extends beyond the literary realm" to the
advocacy of political causes. 76
Anonymity ... provides a way for a writer who may be
personally unpopular to ensure that readers will not prejudge
her message simply because they do not like its proponent.
Thus, even in the field of political rhetoric, where "the identity
of the speaker is an important component of many attempts to
persuade," City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 56 (1994)
(footnote omitted), the most effective advocates have
sometimes opted for anonymity.1
Concluding that the challenged statute was "a direct regulation
of the content of speech," Justice Stevens next considered the nature
of the regulated speech and the level of scrutiny to be applied and
found that the statute "involves a limitation on political expression
subject to exacting scrutiny" and that "[n]o form of speech is entitled
to greater constitutional protection than Mrs. McIntyre's.' ' 78 After
due consideration of the asserted governmental interests, the Court
concluded that the statute was unconstitutional because it was not
designed to promote the nomination or election or defeat of a candidate, or to
promote the adoption or defeat of any issue... unless there appears on such
form of publication in a conspicuous place or is contained within said statement
the name and residence or business address of the chairman, treasurer, or
secretary of the organization issuing the same, or the person who issues, makes,
or is responsible therefore ....
McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334, 338, n.3 (1995) (quoting OHIO REV., CODE ANN., § 3599.09(A)
(1988)).
174. Although some of the handbills identified Mrs. McIntyre as the author, others
only bore the legend: "CONCERNED PARENTS AND TAX PAYERS." Id. at 337.
175. Id. at 341 ("The decision in favor of anonymity may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to
preserve as much of one's privacy as possible.").
176. Id. at 342.
177. Id. (citing Talley, 362 U.S. at 61).
178. Id. at 346 (quoting Meyer v. Grant, 486 U.S. 414, 420 (1988)).
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properly tailored to prevent the asserted dangers. 9 As in Talley, the
majority did not consider whether anonymity is a constitutional right
in all contexts.
In Buckley v. American Constitutional Law Foundation, the
Supreme Court again considered the right of anonymity in the
context of political speech.'" The state of Colorado argued that a law
that required petition circulators to wear identification badges did not
violate the First Amendment. The Supreme Court disagreed.
Equating the circulation of. a petition with the distribution of a
handbill involved in McIntyre, the Court applied "exacting scrutiny"
to determine the constitutionality of the law.' s The Court affirmed
the lower court's finding that the badge requirement was
unconstitutional.' The lower court found that the "badge
requirement discourages participation in the petition circulation
process" because petition gatherers are concerned about
harassment. 83  In so doing, the Court stressed the one-on-one
character of the speech and opined that petition gathering was more
prone to potential harassment than the speech involved in McIntyre."8
Most recently, in Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York
v. Village of Stratton, the Supreme Court went out of its way to
discuss the constitutional right of anonymity as it applies to religious
speech.' Citing the fear of economic or official retaliation expressed
in McIntyre, the majority concluded that "[t]he requirement that a
canvasser must be identified in a permit application.., necessarily
results in a surrender of... anonymity."'6 Although the Court stated
179. In McIntyre, the Court said:
Ohio has not shown that its interest in preventing the misuse of anonymous
election-related speech justifies a prohibition of all uses of that speech. The State
may, and does, punish fraud directly. But it cannot seek to punish fraud
indirectly by indiscriminately outlawing a category of speech, based on its
content, with no necessary relationship to the danger sought to be prevented.
The State of Ohio argued that the disclosure requirement was justified by two
important state interests: (1) the interest in preventing fraudulent and libelous
statements and (2) the interest in providing the electorate with relevant
information.
McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 347-57.
180. 525 U.S. 182 (1999).
181. Id. at 199.
182. Id. at 200.
183. Id.
184. Id. at 199 ("Petition circulation is the less fleeting encounter, for the circulator
must endeavor to persuade electors to sign the petition.").
185. 122 S. Ct. 2080, 2090 n.14, 2002 U.S. LEXIS 442 (2002).
186. Id.
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that such a requirement may be permissible to prevent fraudulent
commercial transactions, the challenged ordinance swept too broadly
to capture the plaintiffs' religious speech.187
Given the broad statements in favor of anonymity that are
contained in Talley, McIntyre, Buckley, and Watchtower, some will
argue that anonymity should be protected in and of itself without
regard to context. This raises the question: Is anonymous speech a
separate category of speech that requires its own test or should
limitations on such speech be judged in accordance with the
underlying context of the speech, e.g., political, literary, religious or
commercial? If the latter, should the constitutional right of
anonymity apply to commercial speech at all and, if so, what level of
scrutiny should apply to anonymous commercial speech? Those who
wish to protect all forms of anonymity on the Internet may argue that
a higher level of scrutiny than was applied in Zauderer or even
Central Hudson should apply.' However, based upon the three
methods of analysis used by the majority, concurring and dissenting
opinions in McIntyre, I believe that the constitutional right of
anonymity should not be extended to commercial speech or, if it is,
that based on Zauderer the regulation of anonymous Internet
advertising should be subject to a low level of scrutiny.
A. The Majority Approach: A Classic Free Speech Analysis
The majority in McIntyre employed a classic free speech analysis
to determine the constitutionality of a law prohibiting anonymous
political speech. The same analysis, set forth in section IV of this
article, should apply to determine the constitutionality of a law
prohibiting anonymous Internet advertising. The majority opinion in
McIntyre does not compel a different result." To the contrary, the
187. Id.
188. In ACLU v. Miller, the first case to discuss the Constitutional right of anonymity
in connection with an attempt to regulate Internet communications, the U.S. District
Court for the Northern District of Georgia examined a Georgia statute that made it a
crime for any person to knowingly transmit data through a computer network if such data
"uses any individual name... to falsely identify the person" or which uses trade names or
logos in a manner that falsely states or implies that the sender was legally authorized to
use them. Miller, 977 F. Supp. 1228, 1230 (1997). Citing the Constitutional right of
anonymity and the overbreadth and vagueness of the statute, the court entered a
permanent injunction against enforcement of the statute because it was not narrowly
tailored to achieve the state's purported compelling interest. Given the expansive
language of the Georgia statute, the Miller court did not directly address the issue raised
above.
189. Although the court in McIntyre noted that "mandating speech that a speaker
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only contexts to which the constitutional right of anonymity was
specifically found to extend were the literary and political realms."9°
According to Justice Ginsburg's concurrence in McIntyre, the
Supreme Court has yet to determine what "other, larger
circumstances" may justify the regulation of anonymous speech.'
Of course, by stating that there may be circumstances where
anonymous speech can be regulated without violating the First
Amendment, Justice Ginsburg telegraphs her view that a
constitutional right of anonymity does not apply to all forms of
speech. Similarly, in footnotes 17 and 18 of the McIntyre decision, the
majority suggests that, at a minimum, restrictions on corporate speech
will be treated differently than restrictions placed on the speech of
individuals.'9 Quoting a passage from First National Bank of Boston
v. Bellotti, 93 Justice Stevens explained: "[C]orporate advertising,
unlike some methods of participation in political campaigns, is likely
to be highly visible. Identification of the source of advertising may be
required as a means of disclosure, so that the people will be able to
evaluate the arguments to which they are being subjected." Citing its
opinion in Buckley v. Valeo, the majority also noted that mandated
disclosure requirements are not improper in all contexts.9  Both of
these statements are consistent with the position that mandated
disclosure requirements in the context of commercial speech are
would not otherwise make necessarily alters the content of the speech," a law prohibiting
anonymous e-commerce should not be judged by the high level of scrutiny that is applied
to content-based regulations for two reasons. 514 U.S. 334 (1994). When evaluating non-
speech, it is necessary to consider the context of the speech in order to categorize the
speech for purposes of free speech analysis. See id. In McIntyre, the non-speech was in
the context of political discourse and, therefore, was judged by an exacting level of
scrutiny. See id. In the case of anonymous e-commerce, the context will dictate
application of an intermediate level of scrutiny applicable to commercial speech. As noted
in Bolger, 463 U.S. 60, 65 (1983), "[i]n light of the greater potential for deception or
confusion in the context of certain advertising messages,... content-based restrictions on
commercial speech may be permissible." Or as Justice Souter noted in Glickman v.
Wellman Bros. & Elliott, Inc., "[r]egulation of commercial speech necessarily turns on
some assessment of content,.., yet that fact has never been thought sufficient to require a
standard of strict scrutiny." 521 U.S. 457, 491, n.6 (1997) (internal citation omitted)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
190. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-43.
191. Id. at 358; see also the Court's recent decision in Watchtower, 122 S. Ct. at 2090.
192. Id. at 353-54.
193. Id. at 354 n.18 (quoting First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 792
(1978)).
194. 514 U.S. at 355; see also Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 475 U.S. at 32-35 (Rehnquist, J.,
White J., and Stevens, J., dissenting as to Part I) (questioning the extension of "negative
free speech rights" to corporations).
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unlikely to violate the constitutional right of anonymity.
Although "commercial speech" is often thought of as one
category of speech for purposes of First Amendment analysis,
Supreme Court precedent makes clear that there are different
gradations of commercial speech that require different analyses.9
On one extreme is commercial speech that is so intertwined with the
exposition of ideas that it is subject to exacting scrutiny.'96 On the
other extreme is what the court in National Federation of the Blind
characterized as "pure commercial speech," which is "more
susceptible to compelled disclosure requirements."'97  Noting that
"the borders of the commercial speech category are not nearly as
clear as the court has assumed," Justice Stevens, in his concurrence in
Rubin v. Coors, set forth a helpful test for determining where
restrictions on commercial speech fall on the commercial speech
continuum:
As a matter of common sense, any description of commercial
speech that is intended to identify the category of speech
entitled to less First Amendment protection should relate to the
reasons for permitting broader regulation: namely, commercial
speech's potential to mislead.
Any "interest" in restricting the flow of accurate information
because of the perceived danger of that knowledge is anathema
to the First Amendment; more speech and a better informed
citizenryZ are among the central goals of the Free Speech
clause.'
Using the foregoing test, the conclusion is inescapable that a law
that prohibits anonymous Internet advertising relates to "commercial
195. In 44 Liqourmart Inc., the Court said,
Rhode Island errs in concluding that all commercial speech regulations are
subject to a similar form of constitutional review simply because they target a
similar category of expression .... When a State regulates commercial messages
to protect consumers from misleading, deceptive, or aggressive sales practices, or
requires the disclosure of beneficial consumer information, the purpose of its
regulation is consistent with the reasons for according constitutional protection
to commercial speech and therefore justifies less than strict review. However,
when a State entirely prohibits the dissemination of truthful, nonmisleading
commercial messages for reasons unrelated to the preservation of a fair
bargaining process, there is far less reason to depart from the rigorous review
that the First Amendment generally demands.
517 U.S. at 501 (1996).
196. See Riley v. Nat'l Fed'n of the Blind, 487 U.S. 781, 796 (1988) ("[W]e do not
believe that the speech retains its commercial character when it is inextricably intertwined
with otherwise fully protected speech.").
197. Id. at n.9 (citing Zauderer, 471 U.S. 626 (1985)).
198. Rubin v. Coors, 514 U.S. 476, 494, 497 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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speech's potential to mislead" and should be judged by a level of
scrutiny no higher than established in Central Hudson. But given the
Court's preference for disclosure as a remedy to prevent fraud, it can
also be argued that the proposed law should be judged by the lesser
standard of Zauderer. Additionally, although not involving face-to-
face solicitations, a law that prohibits anonymous online advertising
seeks to regulate an activity that is more troublesome than the mere
receipt of letters involved in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association.'99
With respect to such a law, the invasiveness of the mode of
communication and the atmosphere of immediacy that often
accompanies Internet advertising will provide further justification for
a law banning anonymous Internet advertising. Further, unlike the
statute that was the subject of scrutiny in McIntyre, a law that
prohibits anonymous Internet advertising will be addressed to a
smaller group of potential speakers and will not attempt to restrict all
anonymous speech but only anonymous speech engaged in by
individuals and companies who choose to sell goods or services over
the Internet.
B. Justice Thomas's Approach: Examining the Practices of the
Founding-Era Americans
In his concurring opinion in McIntyre, Justice Thomas applied "a
different methodology" which focused on the freedom of the press
prong of the First Amendment and on what he believes was the
"original understanding" of the Founding-era Americans .2  "Instead
of asking whether 'an honorable tradition' of anonymous speech has
existed throughout American history, or what the 'value' of
anonymous speech might be, we should determine whether the
phrase 'freedom of speech, or of the press,' as originally understood,
protected anonymous political leafletting."2 °1 After a lengthy analysis
of the history of anonymous speech in the late 1700's, Justice Thomas
concluded that anonymous speech was a part of the freedom of press
199. In Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n, 486 U.S. 466 (1988):
Like print advertising, petitioner's letter - and targeted, direct-mail solicitation
generally - 'poses much less risk of overreaching or undue influence' than does
in-person solicitation. Neither mode of written communication involves 'the
coercive force of the personal presence of a trained advocate' or the 'pressure on
the potential client for an immediate yes-or-no answer to the offer of
representation."' (citations omitted)
Shapero, 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
200. McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 358-71 (Thomas, J., concurring).
201. Id. at 359.
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because "the Framers in 1791 believed anonymous speech sufficiently
valuable to deserve the protection of the Bill of Rights., 212 Although
he would not join the majority's analysis "because it deviates from
our settled approach to interpreting the Constitution and because it
superimposes its modern theories concerning expression upon the
constitutional text," Justice Thomas concurred in the judgment.2 3
Like the majority, he did not consider all of the contexts in which
anonymous speech may arise nor how far the constitutional right of
anonymity should extend.
While Justice Thomas was alone in his approach in McIntyre, it is
interesting to consider whether his approach would require that the
constitutional right of anonymity be extended to commerce. Under
his approach, the question is whether the phrase "freedom of speech,
or of the press" as originally understood by the Founding-era
Americans, protected anonymous advertising or commerce.2' To
answer this question, Justice Thomas would examine historical
evidence to determine if the Founding-era Americans opposed
attempts to require the sellers of goods and services to disclose their
identities. Where no record of discussions on the pertinent issue
appear in the First Congress or in state ratifying conventions ,
Justice Thomas instructs us to "focus on the practices and beliefs" of
the Founders. In McIntyre, the sources that he examined to
determine such practices and beliefs included a number of historical
treatises, letters by members of Congress during the relevant period,
notes from the debates on the Bill of Rights, and newspaper articles
of the time.
As with anonymity generally,2°6 the records of debate on the Bill
of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment do not reveal any
discussions about anonymous advertising or anonymous commerce.
202. Id. at 370.
203. Id.
204. Id. at 358-59.
205. Justice Scalia notes in his dissent that, when analyzing the constitutionality of a
state statute, historical evidence from the time of the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment must also be examined. See McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 371 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
206. See id. at 360.
207. As to the Bill of Rights, see THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, THE DRAFT,
DEBATES, SOURCES, AND ORIGINS (Neil H. Cogan, ed., Oxford University Press 1997);
THE ESSENTIAL BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL ARGUMENTS AND FUNDAMENTAL
DOCUMENTS (Gordon Lloyd & Margie Lloyd eds., University Press of America 1998). As
to the Fourteenth Amendment, see JAMES E. BOND, No EASY WALK TO FREEDOM,
RECONSTRUCTION AND THE RATIFICATION OF THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT
(Praeger 1997); HORACE EDGAR FLACK, THE ADOPTION OF THE FOURTEENTH
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While the Founding-era Americans were obviously concerned about
commerce at the time of the Bill of Rights, they undoubtedly viewed
issues concerning day-to-day commercial practices to be outside the
realm of the federal government and, therefore, not worthy of
constitutional debate. Instead, the discussions of commerce that
occurred during the debates on the Constitution focused on broader
national issues such as the need to improve foreign trading
opportunities, the imposition of tariffs on imports to help finance the
new federal government, and the elimination of trade barriers among
the states3 8
The absence of discussion of anonymity in commerce at the time
of the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment naturally
follows from the assertion in Section II of this article that concerns
about anonymous advertising and anonymous commerce are the
result of a convergence of factors related to the Internet. The
absence of discussion also follows from the nature of commerce in
early America. Until the Industrial Revolution began in the early
nineteenth century and the improvements in transportation and
communication that marked the later part of the nineteenth century,
the United States was largely an agrarian society. Given the
limitations on transportation and communication, and the level of
education of the average citizen, I think it is fair to assume that most
transactions occurring between merchants and consumers at the end
of both the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were conducted
directly. To the extent transactions were conducted indirectly (i.e.,
without the consumer coming face-to-face with the seller), they were
likely to be documented in writing. 9
Particularly before the United States developed its own domestic
manufactures, many goods were imported into the United States from
Europe. Thus, remote contracting was not unheard of at either the
time of the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment. But those
transactions were between merchants and were largely governed by
AMENDMENT (John Hopkins Press 1908).
208. See, e.g., THE FEDERALISTS' PAPERS (The New American Library of the World
ed. 1961), Nos. 11, 12, and 22. The later concern has been characterized as the "demands
of personalty over agrarianism" and explains the federal government's exclusive control
over paper money and the limitation on the states' ability to impair the obligation of
contracts. See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE UNITED
STATES (MacMillan Company 1960).
209. See, e.g., THE AGRICULTURAL PAPERS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON (Walter
Edwin Brooke & Richard G. Badger, eds., The Gorham Press 1919).
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trade practices and customs that developed among them.2 0 To the
extent a merchant engaged in remote contracting with distant places,
he was likely to appoint an agent to represent his interests.2 1 I found
nothing in the historical treatises to suggest that the customs and
practices of early American merchants condoned anonymity in
commercial transactions.2 2 Nor could I find support for anonymous
210. Discussing contract law in early America, Horwitz explained:
For our purposes, the most important consequence of this hostility was that
contract law was insulated from the purposes of commercial transactions.
Businessmen settled disputes informally among themselves when they could,
referred them to a more formal process of arbitration when they could not, and
relied on merchant juries to ameliorate common law rules. And, finally, they
endeavored to find legal forms of agreement with which to conduct business
transactions free from the equalizing tendencies of the courts.
MORTON J. HORWITZ, TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 167
(Harvard University Press 1977).
211. In THE COLONIAL MERCHANT, it is said,
Regardless of the precise pattern followed, a central fact to be borne in mind is
that the merchant himself did not accompany his cargoes to market .... As a
rule, the man to whom he entrusted their execution was either his ship captain or
some merchant who resided at the port of destination, and who thus served as his
commission agent.
THE COLONIAL MERCHANT Part IV, "The Merchant of the Middle and Northern
Colonies," at 169-70 (Stuart Bruchey ed., Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc. 1966). Some may
argue that the "undisclosed principal" theory of agency law condones anonymous
contracting but there are several things to note about agency law that suggest otherwise.
First, whether or not the principal is disclosed, the agent is disclosed and presumably the
identity of the principal could be traced through the agent. Indeed, unless an agent wants
to be the only one responsible on a contract he has an incentive to disclose the principal
either before or at the time a dispute arises. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY
§§ 321, 322 (1959) (providing that an agent is a party to, and therefore liable on, a
contract entered into on behalf of a partially disclosed or undisclosed principal). Second,
as noted in the Comment to § 186 of the Restatement of Agency, the law related to
undisclosed principals is based on equitable considerations and was designed to protect
the interests of the third party by giving him the option to sue either the agent or the
undisclosed principal for breach of contract. In other words, the impetus for the rule was
not a desire to sanction anonymous contracting but rather a desire to make certain that an
agent could not escape liability on a contract by claiming that he was entering into it for
someone else. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 189 cmt.
212. In addition to the historical works cited in notes 207-211, 214-215, 219-222, and
225, I reviewed Morris Cohen's seminal work, BIBLIOGRAPHY OF EARLY AMERICAN
LAW (W.S. Hein & Co. 1998), for any mention of anonymous contracting or advertising. I
also reviewed selected documents from the Early American Imprints Collection of the
University of California, Berkeley. I, of course, am indebted to the wonderful libraries of
the University of California, Berkeley for making accessible hundreds, if not thousands, of
books on early American history and commerce. Unfortunately, I could not read them all,
but based upon the books and documents I did review I am confident in my position that
anonymous contracting and anonymous advertising, if engaged in at all, were not viewed
as fundamental rights at the time of either the Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth
Amendment.
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advertising.
As noted by the Supreme Court in 44 Liquormart: "[a]dvertising
has been a part of our culture throughout our history. Even in
Colonial days, the public relied on 'commercial speech' for vital
information about markets. Early newspapers displayed
advertisements for goods and services on their front pages and town
criers called out prices in public squares." '213 But I could find no
record that anonymous advertising was practiced at the time of the
Bill of Rights, let alone that it was valued as a fundamental right. At
the time of the Bill of Rights, printed advertisements were a relatively
new phenomenon."4 Printing was not widespread in America until
the late 1700's215 and advertising was only a small part of what was
printed. 6 Those few companies and individuals who went to the
expense to purchase print advertising for their goods and wares did so
in order to be better known.217 And if they failed to identify
themselves adequately, their identities could easily be traced through
the printer of the advertisement.
Nonetheless, fraud in commercial transactions and advertising
was not unknown at the time of either the Bill of Rights or the
213. 517 U.S. at 495 (citing JAMES PLAYSTEAD WOOD, THE STORY OF ADVERTISING
21, 45-69, 85 (The Ronald Press Company 1958); J. Smith, PRINTERS AND PRESS
FREEDOM 49 (1988)).
214. See JAMES PLAYSTED WOOD, THE STORY OF ADVERTISING (The Ronald Press
Company 1958); JAMES D. NORRIS, ADVERTISING AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF
AMERICAN SOCIETY, 1865-1920 (Greenwood Press 1990).
215. According to Isaiah Thomas' classic work, THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN
AMERICA, printing itself was not prevalent in the American Colonies until the later part of
the eighteenth century. See 1 ISAIAH THOMAS, THE HISTORY OF PRINTING IN AMERICA
WITH A BIOGRAPHY OF PRINTERS AND AN ACCOUNT OF NEWSPAPERS, (2d. ed.) (5
TRANSACTIONS AND COLLECTIONS OF THE AMERICAN ANTIQUARIAN SOCIETY, 1874).
A printing press was first erected in Massachusetts in 1638 and it was more than forty
years before printing commenced in any other Colony. Printing was next begun in
Virginia in 1681, Pennsylvania in 1689, New York in 1693, and Connecticut in 1709.
Maryland was the next to establish printing in 1726 followed by New Jersey in 1727, South
Carolina in 1730, Rhode Island in 1731, North Carolina and New Hampshire in 1755, and
Delaware in 1761. Georgia was the last of the original thirteen colonies to establish
printing and did so in 1762. After the revolution, Vermont was established as a state and
began printing in 1781.
216. WOOD, supra note 214, at 45-69.
217. Based on a comprehensive review and analysis of advertisements in the London
Times from 1788 to 1996, Sabine Gieszinger noted the typical use of a "signature line."
While it is clear that early advertisers were not as sophisticated about setting their
identities apart from the text of the advertisement, they did identify themselves
somewhere in the advertisement. SABINE GIEZINGER, THE HISTORY OF ADVERTISING
LANGUAGE, THE ADVERTISEMENTS IN THE TIMES FROM 1788 TO 1996 § 3.34, 70 (Peter
Lang ed. 2001).
Stprinp- 20021 IN FOR A CALF
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
Fourteenth Amendment. Undoubtedly, some individuals and
companies - the proverbial "snake-oil salesmen" - would grossly
exaggerate the benefits of their goods and may have operated under
fictitious names. 218 But the fact that some salesmen used fictitious
names in connection with fraudulent enterprises certainly does not
mean the practice was condoned.
One area where anonymity and pseudonymity was common at
the time of the Bill of Rights was in the publishing realm. However,
the mere fact that publishers and journalists practiced anonymity
does not mean that it was valued as a fundamental constitutional right
in the commercial realm. Then, as now, "[i]n some settings,
anonymity was deemed 'libelous,' but in others, as when Cotton
Mather availed himself of the practice (two-thirds of his publications
were anonymous), it was acceptable both to authors and readers as a
sign of self-renunciation or because contemporaries knew how to
recognize the presence of a particular writer., 2
19
Additional factors, other than a fear of retaliation, harm or
ostracism, explain why printers, such as Benjamin Franklin, adopted
the practice of using pseudonyms. First, there is evidence that
pseudonymity was simply a social convention of the time; it was
thought that the printed word had more legitimacy without
identification of the author.22° Second, many printers of the time
adopted the practice of using pseudonyms in order to create the
illusion that they were publishing the works of several different
218. It was these types of practices that led to the enactment of false advertising laws in
the first place.
219. David E. Hall, Readers and Writers in Early New England, in A HISTORY OF THE
BOOK IN AMERICA, VOLUME ONE, THE COLONIAL BOOK IN THE ATLANTIC WORLD,
558 n.109 (Hugh Amory & David D. Hall eds., Cambridge University Press 2000).
220. CHARLES E. CLARK, Part One, Early American Journalism: News and Opinion in
the Popular Press, in A HISTORY OF THE BOOK IN AMERICA, 350, supra, note 218 (citing
MICHAEL WARNER, THE LETTERS OF THE REPUBLIC: PUBLICATION AND THE PUBLIC
SPHERE IN EIGHTEENTH CENTURY AMERICA, 38-39 (Harvard University Press, 1990)):
Michael Warner has suggested that this very 'impersonality' of public
conversation in print was assumed by its participants to constitute its validity -
that the legitimacy of one's participation in the new ' public sphere' of print, and
of the ideas offered to the public in this way, depended upon the absence of any
overt identification with a particular author.
In the introduction to Common Sense, arguably one of the most famous anonymous
pamphlets in history, the later-identified author, Thomas Paine, wrote:
Who the Author of this Publication is, is wholly unnecessary to the Public, as the
Object for Attention is the Doctrine itself, not the Man. Yet it may not be
unnecessary to say, That he is unconnected with any Party, and under no sort of
Influence public or private, but the influence of reason and principle.
THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 6 (The Library of America, 1995).
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authors.221  Even when Founding-era Americans engaged in
anonymous speech, the identities of the writers were often known or
could easily be traced through the printers, so "true anonymity" was
not as prevalent as "apparent anonymity.
222
Unlike the evidence that Justice Thomas uncovered with respect
to political speech, the historical evidence simply does not indicate
"that Founding-era Americans opposed attempts to require that
anonymous [advertisers] reveal their identities on the ground that
forced disclosure violated the 'freedom of the press.""'2  To the
contrary, while the historical evidence reveals little to suggest that
anonymous advertising and commerce was considered a fundamental
right at the time of the Bill of Rights, contemporaneous writings
reflect several of the countervailing policy concerns that are discussed
in Section III of this article. Significantly, the Founding-era
Americans, while recognizing the importance of free speech, also
recognized that free speech could be limited to the extent it invaded
the rights of other individuals.224 Also, the importance of an informed
221. David S. Shields, Eighteenth-Century Literary Culture, in A HISTORY OF THE
BOOK IN AMERICA, 466, supra, note 219:
A truism of Grub-Street practice was that persons whose livelihood most
depended on print sales needed the flexibility of numbers of persons through
which to speak. Multiple pseudonyms (as opposed to single pen-names that
belletrists employed in the sociable world) graced the works of journalists in
print .... 'Diarists' who could afford the vanity of publishing under their own
name usually had a calling that did not depend on vending publications.
222. See, e.g., Letter from Thomas Jefferson to James Madison (November 18,1788) in
THE LIFE AND SELECTED WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON, 452 (Adrienne Koch &
William Peden eds., Random House 1944) ("[W]ith respect to the Federalist, the three
authors had been named to me.").
223. McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334, 361 (1995).
224. Although scholars continue to debate the "original" meaning, intent and origins
of the First Amendment, the Founding-era Americans, at a minimum, shared the view that
"freedom of expression was limited by the rights of other individuals, especially the right
to reputation." Steven J. Heyman, Righting the Balance: An Inquiry Into the Foundations
and Limits of Freedom of Expression, 78 B.U. L. REV. 1275, 1282, 1295, 1296 (1998).
Benjamin Franklin, one of America's earliest and foremost printers and the person who
some hail as the father of American advertising, wrote:
If by Liberty of the Press were understood merely the Liberty of discussing the
Propriety of Public Measures and political opinions, let us have as much of it as
you please: But if it means the Liberty of affronting, calumniating, and defaming
one another, I, for my part, own myself willing to part with my Share of it when
our Legislators shall please so to alter the Law, and shall cheerfully consent to
exchange my Liberty of Abusing others for the Privilege of not being abus'd
myself.
Benjamin Franklin, An Account of the Supremest Court of Judicature in Pennsylvania, viz.,
the Court of the Press, September 12, 1789, in THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra
note 207, at 113.
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populace was frequently cited by the Founding-era Americans as a
reason for freedom of speech and of the press.225
Based upon the foregoing, the argument that the right of
anonymity is so fundamental a right that it should be extended to
commerce cannot be supported by the historical record.
C. Justice Scalia's Approach: Respecting the "Post-Adoption
Tradition"
In his dissent in McIntyre, Justice Scalia chastised both the
majority and Justice Thomas for giving too much credence to the
right of anonymity. Although he does not deny the historical use of
anonymous speech, Justice Scalia does not believe anonymous speech
amounts to a constitutional right. 26 Rather, he views anonymous
speech as falling between two extremes of constitutional analysis. On
the one hand is the technique of looking to the text of the
Constitution itself for its meaning: "That technique is simple of
application when government conduct that is claimed to violate the
Bill of Rights or the Fourteenth Amendment is shown, upon
investigation, to have been engaged in without objection at the very
time the Bill of Rights or Fourteenth Amendment was adopted.
227
At the other extreme is "where the government conduct at issue was
not engaged in at the time of adoption [of the Bill of Rights or
Fourteenth Amendment], and there is ample evidence that the reason
it was not engaged in is that it was thought to violate the right
embodied in the constitutional guarantee."' 28
225. JEFFERY A. SMITH, PRINTERS AND PRESS FREEDOM, THE IDEOLOGY OF
EARLY AMERICAN JOURNALISM (Oxford University Press 1988) ("The marketplace of
ideas concept - the proposition that truth naturally overcomes falsehood when they are
allowed to compete - was used continually during the eighteenth century as a justification
of freedom of expression.").
Commenting on the importance of an informed populace, Thomas Jefferson wrote:
I am persuaded myself that the good sense of the people will always be found to
be the best army. They may be led astray for a moment, but will soon correct
themselves .... The way to prevent these irregular interpositions of the people is
to give them full information of their affairs the channel of the public papers, and
to contrive that those papers should penetrate the whole mass of people.
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Edward Carrington dated January 16, 1787, in THE
COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS, supra note 207, at 115.
226.Mclntyre, 514 U.S. 334, 373 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[To prove that anonymous
electioneering was used frequently is not to establish that it is a constitutional right. Quite
obviously, not every restriction upon expression that did not exist in 1791 or in 1868 is ipso
facto unconstitutional ... .
227. Id. at 372.
228. Id.
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Because Justice Scalia concluded that the regulation of
anonymous speech did not fall into either of the two extremes he
described, he argued the case presented "the most difficult case for
determining the meaning of the Constitution." '229 In such a case,
"constitutional adjudication necessarily involves not just history but
judgment: judgment as to whether the government action under
challenge is consonant with the concept of the protected freedom...
that existed when the constitutional protection was accorded." 3 ' To
apply the judgment that he thinks is necessary, Justice Scalia asserts
that the court must look not only to the beliefs of the Founding-era
and Reconstruction-era Americans but to the practices of the states
and its citizens.3 In other words, Justice Scalia believes that what he
calls the "postadoption tradition" should be examined to determine
the meaning of the Constitution in difficult cases and that "long-
established American legislative practice must be given
precedence.., over historical and academic speculation regarding a
restriction that assuredly does not go to the heart of free speech." '232
Because the law at issue "forbids the expression of no idea, but
merely requires identification of the speaker when the idea is uttered
in the electoral context," he believes the "widespread and long-
accepted practices of the American people are the best indication of
what fundamental beliefs [the constitutional text] was intended to
enshrine." 23 He would reach the same result based on an analysis of
Supreme Court precedent largely because he does not believe that
prior case law established a general right of anonymity.2 34
Since Justice Scalia does not view anonymity as a fundamental
right when related to political speech, he should have no trouble with
the regulation of anonymous speech in the commercial realm. In
accordance with the analysis he employed in McIntyre, his position is
bolstered by the tradition of the states on the issue of anonymous
229. Id. at 375.
230. Id.
231. McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334, 375:
But there is other indication, of the most weighty sort: the widespread and
longstanding traditions of our people. Principles of liberty fundamental enough
to have been embodied within constitutional guarantees are not readily erased
from the Nation's consciousness. A governmental practice that has become
general throughout the United States, and particularly one that has the validation
of long, accepted usage, bears a strong presumption of constitutionality.
232. Id. at 377.
233. Id. at 378.
234. Id. at 379-80.
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commerce and the fact that they have long imposed a myriad of
disclosure requirements on businesses and sought to prevent false
advertising. In the words of Justice Scalia, the existence of state laws
that preclude anonymous commerce is of vital significance because
"[p]rinciples of liberty fundamental enough to be embodied within
constitutional guarantees are not readily erased from the Nation's
consciousness. ,235
If you form a business in this country, there are many ways in
which you are required to disclose basic identifying information about
yourself.236 First, even if you are an individual who is conducting
business under your own name and in the privacy of your home, you
are likely to be required to obtain a business license.237 Next, the
Internal Revenue Service requires you to obtain a taxpayer
identification number,238 and if you collect sales tax, you will typically
be required to obtain a sales tax permit.23 ' Depending upon the
nature of your business, you may also need a special license (e.g., a
liquor license, a contractor's license or a license to practice law) and
be subject to inspections by various governmental authorities.2
If you form a corporation, you must file articles of incorporation
235. Id. at 334.
236. A lot of this information can be gleaned from databases that are comprised of
information collected by both private and public entities from required business filings.
Unfortunately, there is no centralized place where information about all companies who
conduct business in the United States is stored and made accessible to the public and, thus,
multiple databases often must be searched to obtain up-to-date information about
companies. Moreover, the services that do exist typically require payment of a fee and,
therefore, are not useful to the average consumer. Also, because many businesses in the
United States use identical or very similar names, albeit in discrete geographic areas or
markets where the likelihood that one company will be confused with another is slight, a
national database that lists multiple companies with the same name would be of little
practical use to consumers. Thus, given the practical limitations of business databases,
laws that require businesses to disclose basic identifying information in direct dealings
with consumers should be preferred over those that require separate filings. Only in this
way can consumers be given the timely information they need to make informed decisions.
237. See, e.g., Cal. Gov't Code § 37101 (West 2002) (authorizing cities to impose a
business license tax); N.Y. TOWNLAW § 136 (McKinney 2002) (authorizing town boards to
license and otherwise regulate retail businesses).
238. I.R.C. § 6109 (West 2002).
239. See, e.g., Cal. Rev. & Tax. Code § 6066 (West 2002) (requiring every person
desiring to engage in or conduct business as a seller to obtain a sales tax permit) and N.Y.
TOWNLAW, Tax § 1134 (McKinney 2002) (requiring everyone who is required to collect
sales tax to register with the State).
240. See generally CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE (West 2002); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6500-
8500, Title VIII, The Professions (McKinney 2002); 24 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 101
(2002).
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with the appropriate state authorities and periodically file reports that
list the officers of the corporation and its agent for service of
process. 24  If a corporation transacts business in a state without a
physical presence, then it is typically required to register as a foreign
corporation and, among other things, must designate an agent for
242
service of process within the state . If the corporation you form is
subject to the securities laws of the United States, a raft of additional
disclosure requirements come into play. 43
Generally, and assuming that you are abiding by the laws, you
cannot avoid disclosing basic information about your business by
conducting business under a fictitious name, a partnership or limited
liability company. As with corporations, many states require various
documents to be filed with governmental authorities when a limited
liability partnership or limited liability company is formed.'"
Additionally, most states have long required individuals and
companies to regularly file fictitious business name statements if they
conduct business under a name other than their legal name.45
"Although their provisions vary, these statutes generally require that
individual proprietors and certain business entities file statements
containing specified information if the name under which the business
241. For an overview of the corporate name and foreign corporation registration
requirements of the fifty states, see Leonard D. DuBoff, What's in a Name: The Interplay
Between the Federal Trademark Registries and State Business Registries, 6 DEPAUL Bus.
L.J. 15, 21 (1994) ("In all states, domestic corporations must file an annual or biennial
report and pay a fee or they will be administratively suspended or dissolved. Foreign
corporations which do not file their annual or biennial reports and pay their fees will have
their authority revoked.").
Typically, domestic and foreign corporations are required to file a statement of officers
that includes the name and address of the officers and identify an agent for the service of
process. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 202, 2102, 2105 (West 2002); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW §§ 305,402, 1304
242. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 2102, 2105 (West 2002) N.Y. BUS. CORP. LAW §§
402, 1304 (McKinney 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 371 (2002).
243. See The Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. § 77a et seq.; The Securities Exchange
Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 77b etseq.
244. See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 17000-17005. (West 2002); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW
§1306 (McKinney 2002); N.Y. PARTNERSHIP LAW § 121-1500 (McKinney 2002); 6 DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 15-111, 17-201 (Michie 2002).
245. For a history of fictitious business name laws in the United States, see Gordon E.
McClintock, Fictitious Business Name Legislation - Modernizing California's Pioneer
Statute, 19 HASTINGS. L.J. 1349 (1968). There it is noted that "[o]ne of the first 'fictitious
business name statutes' adopted in this country" was adopted by California in 1872. Id. at
1349. It is also noted that at common law, a sole proprietor, partnership and corporation
could conduct business under a fictitious name provided that such usage did not mislead,
perpetuate a fraud, or infringe a trademark or trade name.
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is operated does not adequately inform the public as to the ownership
of the business. 246
Traditional principles of contract law are also consistent with the
view that parties to a contract must identify themselves. How else can
parties to a contract manifest their mutual assent unless they are
known to one another? It has long been understood that contracts
are entered into between parties and, although not specifically stated
in our laws or the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Contracts, the
parties to a contract are usually identified in some manner. Typically,
by convention if not by legal requirement, parties to a written
contract are identified by their correct legal names. Where parties to
a contract are identified by a fictitious name or where one or more of
the parties is represented by an agent, the contract is usually entered
into under circumstances where the correct legal identity of the
principals can be identified.
In addition to general rules governing the conduct of businesses,
both Congress and the states have passed numerous laws that
regulate discrete segments of commerce and that mandate the
disclosure of basic identifying information. For instance, the food and
drug industries are highly regulated by federal statute, and
manufacturers are required to make identifying disclosures on
product labels.247 Laws prohibiting fraud and false advertising have
long existed on the books of many states and the federal
248government. Additionally, most states have laws that impose
registration requirements on charitable solicitors249 and a number of
states require door-to-door salesmen to register with government
authorities and/or disclose certain basic information.
246. Id. at 1351 ("The purpose of the California statute is to prevent fraud and deceit
in business practices by providing a public source of information as to the identity and
addresses of the owners of a business operated under a fictitious name.").
247. See generally Fed. Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-356(c) (1999).
248. For a summary of the law of fraud as it existed at the time of the Fourteenth
Amendment, see MELVILLE M. BIGELOW, LAW OF FRAUD AND THE PROCEDURE
PERTAINING TO THE REDRESS THEREOF (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1981) (1877);
including the appendix of state statutes at pp. 535-636. For a summary of unfair trade
practices acts, see JONATHAN SHELDON, CAROLYN L. CARTER & STEPHEN GARDNER,
UNFAIR AND DECEPTIVE ACTS AND PRACTICES (National Consumer Law Center 2001).
249. See Melissa G. Liazos, Comment, Can States Impose Registration Requirements on
Online Charitable Solicitors?, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1379, 1379 (2000) (noting that "[t]hirty-
eight states and the District of Columbia require charities to register in-state and file
financial and other information prior to soliciting in those states").
250. See, e.g., N.Y. PERS. PROP. §§ 425-431 (McKinney 2002); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§4401-4405 (2002).
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Far from indicating a preference for anonymity in commerce, the
numerous laws applicable to businesses evince a strong policy in favor
of the disclosure of basic information about companies including their
name, principal place of business and management. Thus, consistent
with Justice Scalia's view, the prevalence of disclosure requirements
in the business realm should be enough to ameliorate any concern
that the First Amendment requires that anonymity in commerce and
advertising be protected. In other words, pursuant to Justice Scalia's
approach, a law that bans anonymous Internet advertising would be
upheld against constitutional attack because it is consistent with the
postadoption tradition of the states.
VI. Conclusion
In many ways, the Internet is a great boon to society. It makes
communication more efficient and improves access to important
information. It brings the world closer together and makes it possible
for online communities to form around issues of common interest. It
provides a wonderful forum for increased social and political
discourse and enhances educational opportunities for many. It has
unleashed a raft of new business opportunities and ideas. Given its
benefits, there are many people who advocate that the regulation of
the Internet should be limited and that the Internet should remain an
open and relatively unrestrained forum.
Unfortunately, while the Internet is a great new forum for
information and communication it is also a place where fraud and
criminal activity can proliferate. In the same way that the Internet
has enhanced the way we communicate, obtain information and
conduct business, it has enhanced the ability of con artists to take
advantage of the unsuspecting. The further decentralization of
business that the Internet enables makes the task of preventing fraud
particularly difficult. Con artists can appear one day and be gone the
next. As new ways of committing fraud on the Internet are
developed we need to develop new ways of combating fraud. These
methods need not be complex. In addition to strategies that outlaw
specific egregious activities, we can reduce the incidence of fraud on
the Internet by helping consumers to make informed decisions
My proposal is modest. In order to decrease the potential for
fraud on the Internet and enhance consumers' ability to make
informed decisions, Internet advertisers should be required to clearly
identify themselves by their correct legal name and principal place of
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business. In this way consumers will be given basic information that
will allow them to verify the legitimacy of the individuals and
businesses with whom they propose to do business. It will also
provide law enforcement with another tool to combat fraud that is
not subject to definitional problems such as what is "false" or
"inherently misleading" advertising. Rather, the law will define what
we have apparently always taken for granted: that businesses should
clearly and accurately identify themselves. If this means more
formality in e-commerce transactions than is needed in face-to-face
transactions, so be it.21' Increased formality in e-commerce in the
form of mandatory identification requirements is needed to act as a
substitute for the diminution in traditional indicia of reliability.
Although anonymity has been recognized as a constitutional
right in the political, literary, and religious realms, it should not be
recognized as a constitutional right in the commercial realm. The
same interests that support recognition of a constitutional right of
anonymity in other contexts - principally fear of retaliation, harm and
ostracism - simply do not apply to the sale of goods and services. To
the contrary, we have long insisted that commercial enterprises reveal
sufficient facts to enable consumers to make informed decisions and
to prevent fraud. As the U.S. Supreme Court's commercial speech
jurisprudence reveals, there are legitimate reasons why commercial
speech is subject to a lower level of scrutiny and the advent of e-
commerce and Internet advertising does not alter that balance.
251. I do not agree with the view that rules concerning the manifestation of assent in
the physical world can be applied to electronic commerce without modification. See, e.g.,
Holly K. Towle, Internet Commerce, Pike & Fischer: Internet Law &
Regulation, Law & Policy, IC-Al, A9 (June 2001), at
http://internetlaw.pf.com/html/NewestTopic.asp?Topic=IC (last visited Oct. 29, 2002).
Obviously, when people are not dealing with each other on a face-to-face basis the ways in
which they can manifest their assent are limited (for instance, a nod of the head will not
work) and more formality (usually in the form of a writing) is required if for no other
reason than to communicate each party's point of view. At a minimum there needs to be a
timely exchange of relevant information in the context of the discussion of a particular
transaction.
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